During the RNC and DNC, Jen interviewed nine members of Congress about Congress itself. What is it like to work there? Do they think Congress is dysfunctional? If so, how do they think it could be fixed? In this episode, listen to the most interesting responses from all of the interviews. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources David Daley. October 4, 2024. The Guardian. OpenSecrets. OpenSecrets. Accessed October 30, 2024. Congressional Research Service. Accessed October 30, 2024. Congressional Research Service. Music by Editing Production Assistance

This election has featured a lot of talk about ‘immigration’ and ‘the border’ but has been short on specifics. In this episode, you’ll get those specifics. Specifically, you’ll learn what was in H.R. 2, a Republican bill passed by the House, and you’ll learn what was in the so-called bipartisan border bill which was killed by Donald Trump’s loyalists in the Senate and which Kamala Harris has promised to revive as President. Which bill would actually solve the problems? Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes Current Immigration Process Visas Accessed October 22, 2024. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. Accessed October 22, 2024. Boundless. Accessed October 22, 2024. Boundless. October 22, 2024. USAGov. September 3, 2024. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. Asylum August 1, 2024. USAFacts. Ted Hesson and Mica Rosenberg. June 5, 2024. Reuters. Accessed October 22, 2024. Migration Policy Institute. Unauthorized Immigration John Gramlich. October 1, 2024. Pew Research Center. Jeffrey S. Passel and Jens Manuel Krogstad. July 22, 2024. Pew Research Center. Backlog December 18, 2023. TRAC Immigration. Immigrant Detention Eunice Cho. August 7, 2023. American Civil Liberties Union. Irwin County Detention Center November 15, 2022. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Jonathan Raymond. November 15, 2022. 11 ALIVE. May 20, 2021. WABE. Molly O’Toole. May 20, 2021. The LA Times. C. Carlos Carreiro Immigration Detention Center in Bristol County, MA Ben Berke. May 21, 2021. The Public’s Radio. December 15, 2020. Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General Civil Rights Division. Etowah County Detention Center in Gadsden, Alabama Erin Wise. April 15, 2022. ABC 33 40 News. Ted Hesson and Mica Rosenberg. March 25, 2022. Reuters. March 25, 2022. BirminghamWatch. March 25, 2022. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Paul Moses. June 8, 2018. The Daily Beast. Glades County Detention Center in Moore Haven, Florida February 2, 2022. Freedom for Immigrants. Debbie Wasserman Schultz et al. February 1, 2022. South Texas Family Residential Center Accessed October 22, 2024. OpenSecrets. Sandra Sanchez. Updated June 24, 2024. Border Report. Ted Hesson. June 10, 2024. Reuters. Penalties for Illegally Entering Countries World Population Review. Bipartisan Border Bill Failure Ariana Figueroa. May 24, 2024. Missouri Independent. Catherine Rampell. May 23, 2024. The Washington Post. Mary Clare Jalonick and Stephen Groves. February 7, 2024. AP News. Mary Clare Jalonick and Stephen Groves. February 7, 2024. AP News. The Bills H.R. 2 Outline Division A - Border Wall Would require the Secretary of Homeland Security to resume “all activities” related to constructing a border wall between the US and Mexico that were planned by the Trump administration. Wall would have to be at least 900 miles long, and include not only a physical wall, but also surveillance towers, radars, seismic acoustic detection sensors, and 24 hour drone monitoring. Would require killing all carrizo cane and salt cedar plants along the Rio Grande River by releasing non-stinging wasps imported from Spain and France into the area. Would waive “all legal requirements” that would stand in the way of of building the wall. Division B - Immigration Enforcement and Foreign Affairs Would make it illegal to process asylum claims of individuals who: do not enter at official ports of entry. crossed through another country on their way to the US and did not apply to live there and receive an official denial in each country they entered before entering the US. have been convicted of misdemeanor offenses, allowing the Secretary of Homeland Security or Attorney General to add disqualifying acts without approval from Congress and no court reviews allowed. Would allow the Secretary of Homeland Security to take away the authorization for an individual who has been accepted into the US through the asylum process to work legally in the US. Work permits would only be authorized for 6 months at a time. Would reopen detention centers that were closed by the Biden Administration. Title V - Protection of Children Would require the DHS Secretary to return unaccompanied children back to their home countries if they are not trafficking victims and do not have a fear of Return. Would authorize immigration officers to withdraw a child’s application to be admitted into the United States regardless of the child’s ability or desire to do so. Would require the DHS to collect information - name, social security number, DOB, address, contact info, and immigration status - of people who will be taking custody of immigrant children. Within 30 days of receiving that information, if they determine that individual is not legally in the United States, must initiate removal proceedings. Would change the law so that these people have “access” to lawyers instead of having lawyers to represent them. Title VI - Visa Overstay Penalties Would Increase fines for illegally entering the United States from $50-250 to $500-1000 Would create new penalties for overstaying visas: First offense: fines up to $1,000 or up to 6 months in prison, or both Repeat offenses: fines up to $2,000 or up to 2 years in prison, or both S.4361 Outline Division A - Border Security & Combatting Fentanyl Supplemental Appropriations $6.3 billion to border patrol. $6 billion to Immigration and Customs Enforcement. ~$2.4 billion for deportations. ~$1.6 billion for prisons (the goal in the bill is for ICE to be able to detain 46,500 humans at all times). ~$1.2 billion for services to help people navigate the immigration and asylum system, and to help people leave the country if denied visas (). ~$415 million to hire more ICE agents (goal is to hire 800 more agents). ~$200 million for counter fentanyl investigations. ~$4 billion to US Citizenship and Immigration Services with most going towards hiring more staff. ~ $1.2 billion to the State Department $850 million for “humanitarian needs in the Western Hemisphere” to reduce migration (with the idea being that if their home countries are less dangerous, then people won’t want to come here as often) $230 million to pay other countries to accept deported individuals. $440 million, most of which would be spent on Immigration Judge Teams which include lawyers, court administrators, staff, and court costs. Would expand the number of border patrol and ICE officers authorized to issue a notice to appear, reducing the workload of the judges. Would allow protection determination proceedings to take place in any federally owned or leased building that is not property owned, leased or managed by ICE or border patrol and is “a reasonable distance” from the migrants current residence, expanding the locations where the cases can be heard beyond the already too crowded court buildings. Division B - Border Act Title I - Capacity Building For five years: would give the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to appoint people to positions within the Refugee, Asylum, and International Operation Directorate, the Field Operations Directorate, and the Service Center Operations Directorate of US Citizenship and Immigration Services if the Secretary determines that a critical hiring need exists. would give the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to appoint ICE deportation officers if the Secretary determines that a critical hiring need exists. Would provide a permanent authority for the DHS Secretary to re-hire a former employee to any position in ICE, Border Patrol, or US Citizenship & Immigration Services. Would give asylum officers a 15% pay raise. Would require annual training for border patrol officers about the law, de- escalation techniques, and migrant and agent safety measures. Title III - Securing America For three years, the Secretary of Homeland Security would be given the authority “in the Secretary’s sole and unreviewable discretion” to declare a “border emergency” and remove any migrant who doesn’t have pre-determined permission to enter the United States or doesn’t present themselves at a port of entry in accordance with a process approved by the DHS Secretary. Title IV - Promoting Legal Immigration Would set up a special process to more easily admit no more than 10,000 refugees who worked with the United States from Afghanistan. Would allow the spouse, fiancé, or child of an admitted migrant to join them in the United States and receive employment authorizations. Would slightly increase the number of visas for family members that would be issued in years 2025 through 2029 (512,000 instead of 480,000 = ~ 6% increase). Audio Sources August 22, 2024 29:45 Vice President Kamala Harris: And let me be clear. After decades in law enforcement, I know the importance of safety and security, especially at our border. Last year, Joe and I brought together Democrats and conservative Republicans to write the strongest border bill in decades. The Border Patrol endorsed it. But Donald Trump believes a border deal would hurt his campaign. So he ordered his allies in Congress to kill the deal. Well, I refuse to play politics with our security. Here is my pledge to you: As President, I will bring back the bipartisan border security bill that he killed. And I will sign it into law. July 18, 2024 April 18, 2018 Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Border Security and Immigration Witness: James McHenry, Director, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Department of Justice Clips 2:42 Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX): Earlier administrations, both Republican and Democrat, have struggled with how to reduce the case backlogs in the immigration courts. And, unfortunately, Congress has never provided the full extent of immigration judges and support staff truly needed to eliminate the backlogs. As a result, backlogs continue to grow, from 129,000 cases in fiscal 1998 to a staggering 684,000 as of February 2018. 3:27 Sen. John Cornyn (R-TX): Aliens in removal proceedings sometimes wait for years before they ever appear before an immigration judge. For example, as of February 2018 courts in Colorado have the longest time for cases sitting on their docket more than 1,000 days -- almost three years. In my home state of Texas, the current wait is 884 days -- almost two and a half years. 28:45 James McHenry: A typical immigration court proceeding has two stages, or two parts. The first is the determination of removability. The Department of Homeland Security brings charges and allegations that an alien has violated the immigration laws. The judge, the immigration judge, first has to determine whether that charge is sustained, and that will be based on the factual allegations that are brought, so the judge will make determinations on that. If there is a finding that the alien is removable, then the case proceeds to a second phase. If the judge finds the alien is not removable, then the case is terminated. At the second phase, the immigration judge gives the alien an opportunity to apply for any protection or relief from removal that he or she may be eligible for under the Immigration and Nationality Act. This will involve the setting of a separate hearing at which the respondent may present evidence, they may present witnesses, they have the right to cross-examine witnesses brought by the department, and they will bring up whatever factual bases there is for their claim of relief or protection. At the end of that hearing, the immigration judge will assess the evidence, will assess the testimony, will look at the law, and will render a decision. The judge may either grant the application, in which case the respondent will get to remain in the United States. The judge may deny the application but give the respondent an opportunity to voluntarily depart at their own expense and sometimes after paying a bond, or the immigration judge may order the alien removed. 41:50 Senator Mike Lee (R-UT): I believe you recently testified in front of the House Judiciary Committee that it would take about 700 immigration judges in order to be able to address the backlog and address the current case load. Is that correct? James McHenry: Yeah, last fall the president proposed adding additional immigration judges, up to a number of 700. If we can get 700 on board, especially with our performance measures, we could complete over 450,000 cases a year. That would eviscerate the backlog. Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT): So, 700 would do it…. End of Episode Announcements Andrew Heaton’s New Book: Music by Editing Production Assistance

We’re making it easy for you to judge the job performances of your members of Congress! In this episode, Jen tells you about a list of single issue votes that were taken in the House and Senate during the 118th Congress. Most importantly, we gave you all the information you need to find your members’ voting records in this episode’s show notes. You can find your 2024 Congressional Election Study guide in the episode 301 show notes on www.congressionaldish.com. Happy voting! Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Enacted Laws Congressional Dish Episode: ← find how your Representative voted here ← find how your Senator voted here Effects of H.R. 7888: Expands the number of people allowed to be legally spied on by the U.S. government and the number of people with information stored in the FISA database (which has information about Americans whose data has been collected along with information about foreigners). It does so by… Giving the Department of Justice (DOJ) permission to search the FISA database to vet foreigners who are applying for tourist visas to visit the United States and Expanding the definition of ‘foreign intelligence’ to include counter narcotics targets. Expands the number of companies who get legal immunity for turning our information over to the government by expanding the definition of “electronic communications service provider”. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is no longer legally allowed to search the FISA database solely to find evidence of a crime. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is prohibited from using uncorroborated information from political groups or anonymous sources in press reports to get FISA warrants. Limits the number of people within the government who are allowed to search through the database. Background Sources for H.R. 7888: INTEL.gov. Michael Horowitz. April 27, 2023. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. Jonathan Turley. December 14, 2019. The Hill. Conor Clarke. February 2014. Stanford Law Review. “The Biggs Amendment” to H.R. 7888 [failed] ← find how your Representative voted here Intended Effect of the Biggs Amendment: Would require U.S. government officials to get a warrant before searching through the FISA database for information about U.S. citizens or companies, with emergency exceptions. Congressional Dish Episode: ← find how your Representative voted here Effects of H.R. 7521: It is now illegal for companies to provide internet hosting services, distribute, and/or update “foreign adversary controlled applications”, websites, or games, which are partially owned by a foreign person and are determined by the President - with no proof required - to pose “a significant threat to the national security of the United States.” Establishes a process that allows companies to host, distribute, and/or update if the app, website, or game changes ownership. If companies host, distribute, and/or update the targeted apps, websites, or games, the companies are subject to fines that - depending on the user base of the targeted app, website, or game - can be hundreds of billions of dollars. ← find how your Representative voted here Intended Effects of H.R. 8034: Provide almost $26 billion to Israel. 64% of the money would be for war expenses 35% of the money would be for humanitarian purposes Less than 1% of the money would be for diplomatic expenses Provide $400 million for FEMA Background Sources for H.R. 8034: April 17, 2024. Al Jazeera. Fatima Al-Kassab. January 26, 2024. NPR. ← find how your Representative voted here Intended Effects of H.R. 8035: Provide over $60 billion for Ukraine (and other neighboring countries) 83% of the money would be for war expenses 16.5% of the money would be for humanitarian expenses Less than 0.5% of the money would be for diplomatic expenses Provide $341 million for production of nuclear weapons materials and nuclear nonproliferation programs House Bills ← find how your Representative voted here Intended Effects of H.R. 7023: Double the length of permits to discharge pollutants in waterways from 5 years to 10 years Removes the EPA administrators ability to prohibit discharges in specific disposal sites if he determines that the discharge of materials will have an unacceptable adverse effect on municipal water supplies, shellfish beds and fishery areas, wildlife, or recreational areas after a disposal permit has been issued. Creates nationwide permits to allow for transmission projects for people, water, wastewater, carbon dioxide, fuel, and oil and gas pipelines that do not result in a “loss greater than 1/2 acre of waters of the United States for each single and complete project” In reissuing these nationwide permits, the EPA would not be required to consult with a state nor any other Federal agency and these permits will get to short cut environmental assessments that are required by the National Environmental Policy Act. Limits judicial review Puts a 60 day time limit after the permit is issued for a judicial review Doesn’t allow anyone who didn’t file a comment during the public comment period to file a lawsuit. If someone did file a comment, they may not file a lawsuit about anything that they didn’t address in their comment. Prohibits the court from vacating, revoking, or limiting the permit unless the court finds that the activities authorized “present an imminent and substantial danger to human health or the environment for which there is not other equitable remedy available under the law’ Approves an end-of-Trump administration EPA approval for Florida to administer Clean Water Act permitting. Background Sources for H.R. 7023: Becky Bohrer and Patrick Whittle. January 31, 2023. PBS News. July 19, 2016. Earthjustice. Earthjustice. ← find how your Representative voted here Intended Effects of H.R. 1435: Prohibit states from banning fossil fuel burning internal combustion engines in cars and trucks. Effectively revokes the EPA waiver that allows California to ban the sale of fossil fuel burning cars. Background Sources for H.R. 1435: Jeff St. John. September 23, 2020. Greentech Media. ← find how your Representative voted here Intended effects of H.R. 7176: Give the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the “exclusive authority” to approve or deny applications to export natural gas from the United States to a foreign country, which eliminates requirements for Department of Energy approval and provisions to address free trade agreements. Deems exportation or importation of natural gas to be in the public interest. Background Sources for H.R. 7176: September 26, 2024. National Drought Mitigation Center. Zachary-Taylor Wright. September 17, 2024. MySA. Steven Santana. July 23, 2024. MySA. ← find how your Representative voted here Intended Effects of H.R. 6543: Requires providers of short term lodging (hotels and AirBnBs) and Internet platforms that advertise and sell short term lodging to display the total price including all mandatory fees, except for government taxes and fees. ← find how your Representative voted here Intended Effects of H.R. 3950: Requires ticket issuers and secondary market ticket issuers to clearly display the total ticket price, including all fees, at the time the ticket price is first displayed and provides an itemized list of charges before the ticket purchasing process is complete. Prohibits ticket issuers and secondary market ticket issuers from selling tickets that they do not physically possess at the time of sale. Prohibits secondary ticket issuers from using the word ‘official’ or similar words implying a partnership in their marketing and search engine wording unless they have the consent of the venue, team, or artist. Requires ticket issuers to provide a refund or a similar ticket to a rescheduled event, with the approval of the customer, if an event is canceled or postponed (except for in case of a natural disaster or other event beyond the ticket issuer’s control). ← find how your Representative voted here Intended Effects of H.R. 4639: Prohibits law enforcement or the intelligence community from buying customer or subscriber information directly from companies or from data brokers. Any information “illegitimately obtained” is not allowed to be used against us in court. Has exceptions for FISA surveillance of foreigners. Limits immunity for companies that comply with surveillance orders and do not stop the surveillance when a court order is denied. Background Sources for H.R. 4639: Carly Page. July 18, 2022. TechCrunch. Senior Advisory Group Panel on Commercially Available Information. January 27, 2022. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Byron Tau. June 19, 2020. The Wall Street Journal. Senate Bills ← find how your Senator voted here Intended Effects of S. 316: Repeal the authorizations for US military operations in Iraq that were passed in 1991 and 2002. Background Sources for S. 316: Meghann Myers. January 25, 2024. Military Times. ← find how your Senator voted here Intended Effects of S. 4072: To prevent the enforcement of the , which would set stricter standards for fossil fuel burning cars and trucks that would be phased in between model year 2027 and 2032. Prohibits enforcement of any similar rule that could be written in the future. The standards could be met via the production of cleaner fossil fuel powered vehicles, hybrids, plug-in hybrids, and electric vehicles. EPA estimates the air pollution reductions would provide ~$13 billion in reduced annual health care costs by preventing the emission of thousands of tons of particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic compounds. EPA estimates the new standards would save Americans $46 billion per year in fuel costs and $16 billion per year due to reduced maintenance and repair costs for drivers, totaling ~$6,000 over the course of a new vehicle’s lifetime. ← find how your Senator voted here Intended Effects of S. 4445: Guarantees an individual’s rights to receive fertility treatment, make decisions regarding the donation, use, storage, and disposal of oocytes, sperm, fertilized eggs and embryos, and enter contracts with health care providers to enact those decisions. Guarantees a health provider’s right to provide fertility treatments and provide for testing, use, storage, shipping, and disposal of genetic material including oocytes, sperm, fertilized eggs, and embryos. Guarantees a health insurance provider’s right to cover fertility treatments. Guarantees a manufacturer’s right to manufacture, import, market, sell, and distribute drugs and devices that are used for fertility treatments. Allows lawsuits against any State or individual who interferes with the right to fertility treatments by the Attorney General, health care providers, and individuals adversely affected. This would supersede any State law regardless of when it was enacted and prohibits enforcement of any state law that is in conflict with these rights. Requires the Department of Defense to provide fertility treatments (specifically three egg retrievals and unlimited embryo transfers) to active duty military members and their spouses. Requires health plans, Medicaid, and Medicare that cover obstetrical (child birth related) services to also provide coverage for fertility treatments. Background sources for S. 4445: Maya C. Miller. September 17, 2024. The New York Times. Alander Rocha. April 3, 2024. Alabama Reflector. Alander Rocha. February 19, 2024. Alabama Reflector. Audio Sources March 21, 2024 Clips Rep. Rick Larsen (D-WA): My colleagues have criticized EPA’s use of its Clean Water Act review or veto authority. Yet, the record shows EPA’s use of this authority has been consistent with congressional intent. I see no reason for removing this authority. Since enactment of the Clean Water Act in 1972, EPA has only exercised this authority 14 times—most recently in relation to large-scale mining proposals in Alaska and West Virginia. EPA’s use of this authority has, in fact, been bipartisan. EPA used it 2 times during Democratic administrations and 12 times during Republican administrations. Rep. Eric Burlison (R-MO): This bill will cut red tape, strengthen the permitting process in favor of those seeking the permits, provide clarity to the EPA to ensure that they are following what the law intends, and, most importantly, fight back against the militant climate agenda. Rep. Eric Burlison (R-MO): Our court system is already being attacked from every angle. Let’s not let the environmentalists continue to manipulate the courts to push their climate religion. It should be an efficient and speedy process so businesses can build the infrastructure that our country depends on. Rep. David Rouser (R-NC): Mr. Chairman, in closing, I encourage my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to support this bill, which provides energy predictability and certainty that our utilities, energy, manufacturing, and agricultural industries need to succeed, which are so critical to American greatness in energy, food production, and the manufacturing necessary to improve the standard of living of every American. That is what this is about, Mr. Chairman. Music by Editing Production Assistance

You do not have the right to repair your own belongings because of intellectual property rights granted to corporations by Congress in 1998. In this episode, listen to the debate happening in Congress about if and how they should grant customers the right to repair and get a status update on the multiple efforts under way in the current Congress, including one with a good chance of becoming law. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes McDonald’s Ice Cream Machines Andy Greenberg. December 14, 2023. Wired. Joseph Fawbush. March 29, 2022. FindLaw. John Deere Luke Hogg. January 8, 2024. Reason. Internet of Things Updates and Maintenance Márk Szabó. August 27, 2024. WeLiveSecurity. Massachusetts Auto Repair Law Massachusetts Office of the Attorney General. DoD’s Revolving Door OpenSecrets. OpenSecrets. Karl Evers-Hillstrom and Reid Champlin. June 18, 2019. OpenSecrets. OpenSecrets. Salary.com. Military Right to Repair Issues Kyle Mizokami. February 11, 2020. Popular Mechanics. Max Finkel. February 8, 2020. Jalopnik. Elle Ekman. November 20, 2019. The New York Times. Lucas Kunce and Elle Ekman. September 15, 2019. Technological Protection Measures (TPMs) Jennifer Zerkee. November 8, 2023. Simon Fraser University. Cyber Risks Sam Curry et al. January 3, 2023. samcurry.net. Apple Lawsuit Brandon Vigliarolo. December 18, 2023. The Register. NDAA Sec. 828 Jason Koebler. August 28, 2024. 404 Media. AdvaMed et al. July 30, 2024. DocumentCloud via 404 Media. Laws Bills Sec. 828 : REQUIREMENT FOR CONTRACTORS TO PROVIDE REASONABLE ACCESS TO REPAIR MATERIALS. Fair Repair Act Audio Sources May 16, 2024 Senate Armed Services Committee Witnesses: Carlos Del Toro, Secretary of the Navy Clip Sen. Elizabeth Warren: So the Navy acquires everything from night vision goggles to aircraft carriers through contracts with big defense contractors, but the contractors often place restrictions on these deals that prevent service members from maintaining or repairing the equipment, or even let them write a training manual without going back through the contractor. Now the contractors say that since they own the intellectual property and the technical data underlying the equipment, only they have the right to repair that equipment. These right to repair restrictions usually translate into much higher costs for DOD, which has no choice but to shovel money out to big contractors whenever DOD needs to have something fixed. So take the Navy's littoral combat ship, General Dynamics and Lockheed Martin considered much of the data and equipment on the ship to be proprietary, so the Navy had to delay missions and spend millions of dollars on travel costs, just so that contractor affiliated repairmen could fly in, rather than doing this ourselves. Secretary Del Toro, when a sailor isn't allowed to repair part of their ship at sea, and a marine isn't allowed to access technical data to fix a generator on a base abroad. One solution is for the Navy to buy the intellectual property from the contractors. So can you say a little bit about what the benefits are of the Navy having technical rights for the equipment that it has purchased. Sec. Carlos Del Toro: The benefits are enormous, Senator, and we've actually had tremendous success, I'd say, in the last year and a half to two years, through the taxpayer advocacy program that we initiated when I came in. There have been three examples, one, gaining the intellectual property rights for the new ACV class of ships that will replace the AAVs. The F-35 negotiations really proved themselves out in a significant way as well, too. And lastly, the 20 F-18s that the Congress authorized in ‘22 and ‘23, we were able to make significant gains in terms of the government finally getting the intellectual property rights that were necessary for us to be able to properly sustain those moving forward. Sen. Elizabeth Warren: So I am very, very glad to hear this. I like the taxpayer advocacy project and how you're training contract officers to secure technical equipment that the Navy buys, but I think you should have the support of Congress on this. Senator Braun and I have introduced the Stop price gouging the military act to give DoD more tools to get cost and pricing data so that you will be in a better position to negotiate better deals with contractors. There's also more that we can do to ensure that the Navy and the rest of the services have the rights they need to bolster readiness. So let me ask you, Secretary Del Toro, would having a stronger focus on right to repair issues during the acquisition process, like prioritizing contract bids that give DoD fair access to repair materials, and ensuring that contract officers are looking into buying technical rights early on, would that help the Navy save costs and boost readiness at the same time? Sec. Carlos Del Toro: Very much. Senator, in fact, one of the things that we have prioritized since I came in as Secretary of the Navy, given my acquisition background, is actually those negotiations need to happen as early as possible before that we even as we develop the acquisition strategy for that contract to go out to bid, and by doing so, we will reap tremendous returns. July 18, 2023 House Judiciary Committee Witnesses: Aaron Perzanowski, Thomas W. Lacchia Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School , Legal Fellow, Hudson Institute’s Forum for Intellectual Property Kyle Wiens, Co-founder and CEO, iFixit Paul Roberts, Founder, SecuRepairs.org; Founder and Editor-in-Chief, the Security Ledger Scott Benavidez, Chairman, Automotive Service Association; Owner, Mr. B’s Paint & Body Shop Clips 41:25 Scott Benavidez: My name is Scott Benavidez. I'm the Chairman of the Automotive Service Association's Board of Directors. I am also a second generation shop owner from Albuquerque, New Mexico, Mr. B's Paint and Body Shop. Scott Benavidez: We do have concerns when some insurers insist on repairs that are simply cheaper and quicker, without regard to quality and safety. Repairers understand better than anyone the threat of replacement crash parts or lesser quality. We can and should have a competitive marketplace that doesn't compromise quality or safety, deciding to only cover the cheapest option without understanding implications for quality leaves collision shops and their customers in a tough position. Very few consumers have the knowledge about these types of crash parts used on their vehicles as numerous crash parts in the marketplace, such as OEM (original equipment manufactured) parts, certified aftermarket parts, aftermarket parts, reconditioned crash parts, and recycled crash parts. Repairers can make recommendations, but their customers are unlikely to hear if the insurance won't cover them. 46:45 Paul Roberts: My name is Paul Roberts, and I'm the founder of Secure Repairs. We're an organization of more than 350 cyber security and information technology professionals who support the right to repair. 46:55 Paul Roberts: I'm speaking to you today on behalf of our members to make clear that the fair access to repair materials sought by right to repair laws does not increase cyber risk, and in fact, it can contribute to a healthier and more secure ecosystem of smart and connected devices. Paul Roberts: Proposed right to repair legislation considered by this Congress, such as the Repair Act, or last session, the Fair Repair Act, simply asks manufacturers that already provide repair information and tools to their authorized repair providers to also provide them at a fair and reasonable price to the owners of the devices and to third parties that they may wish to hire to do their work. 47:35 Paul Roberts: By definition, the information covered by right to repair laws is not sensitive or protected, as evidenced by the fact that the manufacturers already distribute it widely to hundreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands of workers for their authorized repair providers. This could be everyone from mechanics working at auto dealerships to the folks staffing the Geek Squad at Best Buy. 48:00 Paul Roberts: Also, we have yet to find any evidence that the types of information covered by right to repair laws like schematic diagrams, service manuals, diagnostic software and replacement parts act as a portal to cyber attacks. The vast majority of attacks on internet connected devices - from broadband routers to home appliances to automobiles - today exploit weaknesses in the embedded software produced and distributed by the manufacturers, or alternatively, weak device configurations so they're deployed on the internet in ways that make them vulnerable to attack. These security weaknesses are an epidemic. A recent study of the security of Internet of Things devices, by the company Phosphorus Labs, or a cybersecurity company, found that 68% of Internet of Things devices contained high risk or critical software vulnerabilities. As an example, I'd like to call attention to the work of a group of independent researchers recently led by Sam Curry, who published a report, and you can Google this, "Web Hackers vs. the Auto Industry" in January 2023. That group disclosed wide ranging and exploitable flaws in vehicle telematics systems from 16 different auto manufacturers. At a leading GPS supplier to major automakers, the researchers claimed to obtain full access to a company-wide administration panel that gave them the ability to send arbitrary commands to an estimated 15.5 million vehicles, including vehicles used by first responders, police, fire and so on. Hacks like this take place without any access to repair materials, nor is there any evidence that providing access to repair software will open the doors to new attacks. 50:05 Paul Roberts: For the last 25 years, Section 1201 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act has given manufacturers an incentive to deploy software locks widely and to limit access to security researchers. That's kind of a model what we call in cybersecurity, security through obscurity. In other words, by keeping the workings of something secret, you're making it secure. But in fact, that doesn't work, because cyber criminals are very resourceful and they're very determined, and they don't really care what the law says. 50:35 Paul Roberts: Section 1201 has also enabled what one researcher has described as dark patterns in the design and manufacture of hardware that includes everything from locking out customers from access to administrative interfaces, administrative features of the products that they own, as well as practices like part pairing, which Kyle will talk to you more about, in which manufacturers couple replaceable components like screens and sensors and cameras to specific device hardware. Such schemes make manufacturers and their authorized repair providers gatekeepers for repairs, and effectively bar competition from the owners of the devices as well as independent repair providers. 54:45 Kyle Wiens: You think about what is local? What is American? Main Street you have a post office and a repair shop. And unfortunately, we've seen the whittling down of Main Street as the TV repair shops went away when the manufacturers cut off access to schematics, as the camera repair shops went away when Nikon and Canon decided to stop selling them parts. We've seen this systematically across the economy. In the enterprise space, you have Oracle and IBM saying that you can't get security updates to critical cyber infrastructure unless you buy a service contract with them, so they're tying long term service contracts with the security updates that are necessary to keep this infrastructure secure. 56:45 Kyle Wiens: Over the last decade plus, I've been working on Section 1201, trying to get exemptions for the ability to repair products. The challenge that we've had in the section 1201 process every triennial I go back and we ask for permission to be able to fix our own things is that the exemptions we've gotten really only apply to individual consumers. They aren't something that I could use to make a tool to provide to one of you to fix yourself. So in order for someone to take advantage of a 1201 exemption that we have, they have to be a cybersecurity researcher and able to whittle their own tools and use it themselves, and that just doesn't scale. 57:45 Devlin Hartline: My name is Devlin Hartline, and I'm a legal fellow at the Hudson Institute's forum for intellectual property. 57:50 Devlin Hartline: I'd like to start with a question posed by the title of this hearing, is there a right to repair? And the answer is clearly no. A right is a legally enforceable claim against another, but the courts have not recognized that manufacturers have the duty to help consumers make repairs. Instead, the courts have said that while we have the ability to repair our things, we also have the duty not to infringe the IP rights in the process. So it is in fact, the manufacturers who have the relevant rights, not consumers. 58:30 Devlin Hartline: Right to repair supporters want lawmakers to force manufacturers to make the tools, parts, and know-how needed to facilitate repairs available to consumers and independent repair shops. And the assumption here is that anything standing in the way of repair opportunities must necessarily harm the public good, but these tools, parts and know-how, are often protected by IP rights such as copyrights and design patents. And we protect copyrighted works and patented inventions because, as the Constitution recognizes, this promotes the public good. We reward creators and innovators as an incentive for them to bring these things to the marketplace and the public benefits from the introduction of new products and services that increase competition. Thus, the right to repair movement isn't based on a pre-existing right. It's instead asking lawmakers to create a new right at the expense of the existing rights of IP owners. 1:00:45 Devlin Hartline: IP owners are merely exercising their federally protected IP rights, and this is not actionable anti-competitive conduct. It is instead how the IP system is supposed to work. We grant IP owners exclusive rights so they can exclude others, and this, in turn, promotes the investments to create and to commercialize these creative innovations in the marketplace, and that promotes the public good. Aaron Perzanowski: My name is Aaron Perzanowski. I am a professor of law at the University of Michigan, and for the last 15 years, my academic research has focused on the intersection of personal and intellectual property rights in the digital economy. During that time, the right to repair has emerged as a central challenge to the notion that we as consumers control the devices that we buy. Instead consumers, farmers, small businesses, all find that manufacturers exert post-sale control over these devices, often in ways that frustrate repair. Aaron Perzanowski: Repair is as old as humanity. Our Paleolithic ancestors repaired hand axes and other primitive tools, and as our technologies have grown more complex, from the Bronze Age through the Renaissance, to the high tech devices that we all have in our pockets here today, repair has always kept pace. But today, manufacturers are employing a range of strategies that restrict repair, from their hardware and software design choices to clamp downs on secondary markets, and we also troublingly see attempts to leverage IP rights as tools to restrict repair. These efforts are a major departure from the historical treatment of repair under the law, the right to repair is not only consistent with nearly two centuries of IP law in the United States, it reflects half a millennium of common law property doctrine that rejects post-sale restrictions on personal property as early as the 15th century. English property law recognized that once a property owner sells an item, efforts to restrain how the new owner of that item can use it are inconsistent with the essential nature of private property and obnoxious to public policy. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized, IP laws' respect for the property interests of purchasers of copyrighted and patented goods was profoundly shaped by this common law tradition. In 1850, the Supreme Court recognized that the repair of a patented machine reflected "no more than the exercise of that right of care, which everyone may use to give duration to that which he owns." A century later, the Court held that the repair of a convertible car roof was justified as an exercise of "the lawful right of the property owner to repair his property." And just a few years ago, the court reaffirmed the rejection of post-sale restrictions under patent law in Impression Products vs. Lexmark, a case about refurbishing printer ink cartridges. Copyright law, not surprisingly, has had fewer occasions to consider repair restrictions. But as early as 1901, the Seventh Circuit recognized "a right of repair or renewal under US copyright law." When a publisher sued to prevent a used book dealer from repairing and replacing damaged components of books, the court said that "the right of ownership in the book carries with it and includes the right to maintain the book as nearly as possible in its original condition." A century after that, Congress itself acknowledged repair as a right that owners enjoy, regardless of copyright restrictions, when it enacted section 117 C of the Copyright Act. That provision was designed to undo a Ninth Circuit decision that allowed copyright holders to prevent third party repairs of computers. Section 117 C explicitly permits owners of machines to make copies of computer programs in the course of maintenance or repair. And finally, the US Copyright Office over the last decade has repeatedly concluded that diagnosis, repair, and maintenance activities are non-infringing when it comes to vehicles, consumer devices, and medical equipment. So the right to repair is firmly rooted in basic principles of US IP law. Aaron Perzanowski: Section 1201 of the DMCA makes it practically impossible for consumers to exercise their lawful right to repair a wide range of devices, from tractors to home electronics, even though the copyright office says those activities are not infringing, and the weakening of standards for design patents allow firms to choke off the supply of replacement parts needed to repair vehicles, home appliances, and other devices. Aaron Perzanowski: One way to think about a right is as an affirmative power to force someone else to engage in some behavior, and in some cases, that is what we're talking about. We're talking about imposing, especially on the state level, regulations that impose requirements on manufacturers. I think that's true of the Repair Act on the federal level as well. But, I think part of what we also need to keep in mind is that sometimes what you need to effectuate a right is to eliminate barriers that stand in the way of that right. So we can think about this, I think, helpfully in the context of tools that enable people to engage in repair. The state level solution has been to require manufacturers to give their own tools to repair shops, sometimes compensated under fair and reasonable terms. The other solution would be to change section 1201 to say, let's allow independent repair shops to make their own tools. I think both of those solutions have some value to them. I also think it's really important to keep in mind that when we're talking about IP rights, there are always multiple sets of interests at stake, and one of the key balances that IP law has always tried to strike is the balance between the limited statutory exclusive rights that the Patent and Copyright Acts create and the personal property rights of consumers who own these devices. And so I think a balancing is absolutely necessary and appropriate. 1:15:20 Aaron Perzanowski: I think the best solution for Section 1201 is embodied in a piece of legislation that Representatives Jones and Spartz introduced in the last Congress, which would create a permanent exception to Section 1201 for repair that would apply not only to the act of circumvention, but would also apply to the creation and distribution of tools that are useful for repair purposes that does not open the door to broad, unrestrained, creation of circumvention tools, but tools that are that are targeted to the repair market. 1:16:40 Devlin Hartline: He cited a case about where you can repair a cover on a book. That's very different than recreating the book, every single word in it, right? So there's a difference between repairing something and then crossing the line into violating the exclusive rights of IP owners in the patented product or the copyrighted book. And so the things that repair supporters are asking for is that, if somebody has a design patent that covers an auto body part, well, they have the right to exclude other people from making that part, but repair supporters say they shouldn't have that exclusive right, because, you know, we could increase competition if we just took away their design patent and now other people could make that part, and so that's competition. But that's not the type of competition that IP law and competition law seek to support. That's like saying, if we just let the Pirate Bay copy and distribute all of the Disney blockbuster movies, then that's competition, and prices would go down. But that's not the way that we do it, right? So competition means other people come up with new products and new services, and so that's what we should be trying to support. 1:26:45 Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY): Repair advocates argue that section 1201, prevents non-infringing circumvention of access controls for purposes. But Congress contemplated this use when it passed the DMCA in 1998, allowing for a triennial exemption process. Is the exemption process working as intended? And if not, are there actions Congress can take to expand exemptions or make them easier to acquire? Devlin Hartline: What's important about the triennial rulemaking is that the proponent of an exemption has to come forward with evidence and demonstrate that there's actually a problem and it relates to a certain class of works, and then they can get a temporary exemption for three years. And so it is true that the Librarian of Congress, the last few rulemakings, has said that because using a copyrighted work in a way for repair, maintenance, etc, is Fair Use that they grant these exemptions. But these exemptions are quite narrow. They do not allow the trafficking of the computer programs that can crack the TPMs. And so it's very narrowly done. And the concern is that if you were to create a permanent exemption that opens things all the way up with access controls, copy controls and trafficking thereof, is now you're getting to the point of why we even have these TPMs under 1201 in the first place, and that's because they guard against piracy. And so the concern is that you're opening the piracy floodgates. You make these devices less secure, and then content owners are going to be less likely to want to put their content on these devices. Rep. Ben Cline (R-VA): How does section 1201 of the DMCA impact the ability of consumers and independent repair shops to modify or repair devices that have proprietary software and data in the consumer electronics industry? Aaron Perzanowski: Thank you so much for the question. As we've been talking about the copyright office in 2015, 2018, 2021, and they're in the process for the current rulemaking, has determined that engaging in circumvention, the removal or bypassing of these digital locks for purposes of repair, is perfectly lawful behavior, but there is a major practical mismatch here between the legal rights that consumers enjoy under federal law today and their practical ability to exercise those rights. And that's because, as Devlin was just describing, the section 1201 rulemaking does not extend to the creation or distribution of tools, right? So I have the right under federal law, to remove the technological lock, say, on my video game console, if I want to swap out a broken disk drive. How do I do that? I'd like to think of myself as a pretty technologically sophisticated person. I don't have the first clue about how to do that. I need a person who can write that code, make that code available to consumers so that I can. All I'm trying to do is swap out a broken disk drive on my video game. But you would argue that code is proprietary, correct? So I'm talking here about a third party making their own code that is simply allowing me to engage in activity that the Copyright Office has repeatedly said is non-infringing. Rep. Ben Cline (R-VA): So you want to give them a map. Is that, essentially, what you're saying? Aaron Perzanowski: Absolutely, yes, I do. Rep. Ben Cline (R-VA): Do trade secrets play a role in the right to repair debate? Aaron Perzanowski: There are occasions where trade secrets are important. I don't think in the context that we're talking about here with section 1201, that we're typically running into trade secret issues. The state-level bills that have been introduced do typically address trade secrets and often have carve outs there. And I think that's something worth considering in this debate. But I think it's important to keep in mind that just because we have some hypothetical worry about some unknown bad actor taking a tool that I use to fix my video game console -- Rep. Ben Cline (R-VA): It's not unknown. The Chinese do it all the time. Aaron Perzanowski: I don't think the Chinese are particularly worried about whether or not I can fix my video game console, and in fact, I think that point is important, but the bad actors already have these tools. All we're trying to do is get very targeted tools in the hands of law abiding citizens who just want to repair the stuff they buy for their kids for Christmas, right? If the Chinese are going to hack the PlayStation, they've already done it. 1:32:25 Aaron Perzanowski: So the 1201 process is what established the legality of circumvention for repair purposes. But when Congress created that rulemaking authority, it only extends to the act of circumvention, the actual removal. Congress did not give the [Copyright] Office or the Librarian [of Congress] the authority to grant exemptions to the trafficking provisions, and that's where I think legislative intervention is really important. 1:39:00 Kyle Wiens: One of the challenges was section 1201. It doesn't just ban repair tools, it also bans the distribution of cybersecurity tools. And so we've seen security researchers....Apple sued a company that made a security research tool under 1201 and that tool has markedly made the world more secure. It's very popular amongst government security researchers. So I think that's kind of the sweet spot is, allow some third party inspection. It'll make the product better. 1:41:25 Kyle Wiens: These ice cream machines are made by Taylor, and there is an incredibly complex, baroque set of touchscreens you have to go through. And then there's a service password you have to be able to get past in order to access the settings that really allow you to do what you want. And so, in an ideal world, you'd have an entrepreneur who would come along and make a tool to make it easier for McDonald's, maybe they could have an app on their phone that they could use to configure and help them diagnose and repair the machine. Unfortunately, the company who made that tool is struggling legally because of all these challenges across the board. If we had innovation outside of the manufacturers and to be able to develop new tools for fixing ice cream machines or anything else, you have a whole flowering ecosystem of repair tools right now. It doesn't exist. The US is like this black hole where innovation is banned in software repair. There's all kinds of opportunities I could see, I had a farmer ask me for help fixing his John Deere tractor, and I had to say, I can't do that particular repair because it's illegal. I'd love to build a cool app for helping him diagnose and fix his tractor and get back back in the field faster. We don't have that marketplace right now. It's like farmers have been forced to, like, use cracked Ukrainian versions of John Deere diagnostic software, right? Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): So it's not just ice cream machines. I led off with that, but it's farmers, it's farm equipment, it's iPhones, it's somebody's Xbox, right? I mean, these are all things.... in your experience, what are the challenges that these customers and stakeholders face when they're trying to repair their own devices? What are some things that they face? Kyle Wiens: It's absolutely infuriating. So my friend, farmer in San Luis Obispo, Dave grows all kinds of amazing products. He has a $300,000 John Deere tractor, came to me and said, Hey, there's a bad sensor. It's going to take a week to get that sensor sent out from Indiana, and I need to use the tractor in that time. Will you help me bypass the sensor? I could hypothetically modify the software in the tractor to do that. Practically, I didn't have the legal ability, and so he had to go and rent an expensive tractor for the week. This is impacting people's lives every single day. 1:43:50 Rep. Russell Fry (R-SC): So, to pivot a little bit, what role do you see from a federal side, from legislation, and what specific measures do you think might be included in such legislation? Kyle Wiens: So we've seen the solutions being approached from two angles. At the state level, you have states saying John Deere and other manufacturers, if you have a dealership that has fancy tools, sell those tools to consumers and to independent shops, allow that competition. At the federal level, what we can do is enable a competitive marketplace for those tools. So rather than compelling John Deere to sell the tool, we can say, hey, it's legal for someone, an entrepreneur, to make a competing tool. And you have this in the car market. You can take your car down the AutoZone, you can buy a scan tool, plug it into your car, and it'll decode some of the error messages. Those tools exist on the auto market because we have a standard diagnostic interface on cars that you can access without circumventing a TPM. We don't have that for any other products. So another farmer in my town, he showed me how if he has a transmission go out on a truck, he can fix that. But if he has a transmission go out on his John Deere tractor, he can't. He can physically install the transmission, but he can't program it to make it work. I'd love to be able to make a software tool to enable him to replace his transmission. Aaron Perzanowski: So I think if we see passage of the SMART Act, we can anticipate significant reductions in the expenses associated with auto collision repairs. Estimates are that design patents on collision parts are responsible for about $1.5 billion in additional expenditures. We see price premiums on OEM parts over third party parts often reaching into like the 40% range, right? So these are pretty significant cost savings associated with that. Part of this problem, I think, does relate back to the kind of unique structure of this market. Most consumers are not paying out of pocket for collision repairs. Those costs are being covered by their auto insurance provider, and so the consumer doesn't see that the - I'm pulling this from memory, so don't hold me to this figure - but the side view mirror of a Ford Fiesta costing $1,500, that's not something that the consumer is confronted with, right? So this goes back to the question of notice. Do consumers know when they buy that vehicle that the repairs are going to be that expensive? I think in most cases, they don't. And so I think the SMART Act is a very targeted solution to this problem. I do think it's important to note that the design patent issue for replacement parts is not limited to the automotive industry. I think it's the most, I think that's the area where the problem is most pressing. But home appliances, consumer electronics, we see companies getting design patents on replacement water filters for refrigerators so that they can charge three times as much when the little light comes on on your fridge to tell you that your water might not be as clean as you want it to be. So I think we have to think about that problem across a range of industries, but the automotive industry, I think, is absolutely the right place to start. Paul Roberts: I mean, one point I would just make is that with the Internet of Things, right, we are facing a crisis in the very near future as manufacturers of everything from home appliances to personal electronics to equipment, as those products age and those manufacturers walk away from their responsibility to maintain them. So we're no longer supporting the software. We're no longer issuing security updates. Who will step in to maintain those devices? Keep them secure, keep them operating right? The manufacturers walked away. Do we just get rid of them? No, because the equipment still works perfectly. We're going to need a market-based response to that. We're going to need small businesses to step up and say, hey, I'll keep that Samsung dishwasher working for another 20 years. That's a huge economic opportunity for this country, but we cannot do it in the existing system because of the types of restrictions that we're talking about. And so this is really about enabling a secure future in which, when you buy a dishwasher with a 20 year lifespan, or 25 year lifespan, it's going to last that 25 years, not the five to six years that the manufacturer has decided, you know, that's how long we want to support the software for. Paul Roberts: My understanding is the use of design patents has increased dramatically, even exponentially, in the last 10 to 15 years. If you go back to the 90s or 80s, you know, parts makers, automakers were not applying these types of patents to replaceable parts like bumpers and rear view mirrors. Somebody had a business decision that, if you can do so, then we can capture more of that aftermarket by outlawing identical aftermarket replacements that has a huge downstream impact on car owners and on insurers and on all of us. 2:10:15 Paul Roberts: Both of the things that we're really proposing or talking about here, which would be changes to Section 1201 of the DMCA as well as passage of robust right to repair laws, would empower a market-based response to keeping the internet of things working, secure and functioning. DMCA 1201 reforms by making it clear that you can circumvent software locks for the purpose of repair and maintenance and upkeep, right? So that would take the threat of the federal crime away from small business owners as well as security researchers who are interested in, you know, plumbing that software for purposes of maintenance, upkeep and repair. And on the right to repair by making the tools available to maintain and upkeep products - diagnostic software, schematic diagrams, service manuals - available. Once again, you'll be empowering small business owners to set up repair shops and say, I'm going to keep your smart appliance running for its full 25 or 30 year lifespan, and I'm going to support my family doing that locally, and not be basically choked out of business by a company that says, Well, you don't have the right to access this product. From a cybersecurity perspective, that is really important, because one thing we don't want is a population of millions or tens of millions of out of date, unsupported, unpatched, insecure internet connected home appliances, webcams, home routers out there available to nation state actors, cyber criminal groups, to compromise and use for their own purposes. And that's something we already see, particularly around broadband routers and other types of devices, and it's a real threat going forward that I think this type of these types of changes would support. Aaron Perzanowski In a lot of instances, this conversation, and we've touched on this earlier, focuses on cost savings, right? And cost savings are an important consideration, right? Farmers aren't thrilled that they have to pay a technician from the John Deere dealer to drive maybe hours to get to their farm and connect their laptop and, you know, download these payload files to enable their equipment to work. But in the agricultural space, the thing I hear most often in the conversations I have with farmers is and Kyle touched on this a bit earlier, is a real concern about the time sensitivity of their work. If your tractor is out of commission for a week or two in the wrong part of the season, that is going to have disastrous effects, right, not only on that farm's economic outlook, but collectively, it can have an impact like, not to be hyperbolic here, but on our national food supply, and so I think it's really important that farmers have flexibility in terms of where and how they execute repairs, so that they can get their equipment back up and running. If my laptop breaks and I can't get it fixed for a week or two, I'm annoyed there will be emails that go unanswered, but like the world will continue to spin. That is not the case in the agricultural space where we, I think, have to be much more concerned. Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA): If I remove from my BMW, at least during certain models, I remove the radio, unplug it, and then plug it back in, simply because I was fiddling around with the dash, I now have to go back to the dealer to reinstall it. Similarly, the transmission example. I've got two John Deere tractors. One's got a busted engine, the other's got a busted transmission. Currently, they will prohibit you from moving the transmission from one to the other. From a standpoint of intellectual property, where, in God's green earth or the Constitution, are any of those designed to be rights that belong to the manufacturer, rather than rights that belong to the owners of those two John Deere tractors? Devlin Hartline: So those are a bunch of different situations, and so I think there would be underlying facts that differ with each right. So we started on the iPhone, and I was going to point out that iPhone will actually give you the tool to synchronize it. In those other situations, I don't know the business justification for it. How is that an IP problem? Right? So if that's locked up with the TPM, and you have to bypass the TPM, well then that's a violation of 1201, so that's how they can that's how they can lock -- Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA): So what you're saying is that Congress has created impediments to the right to repair. Mr. Roberts, would you say that is correct? That, in fact, the right to repair, were Congress never to have done anything since, you know, George and Thomas were our presidents, so to speak, knowing those two presidents, we'd be able to do things we're not able to do because they're now prohibited by acts of Congress. Paul Roberts: Yes, and we certainly know going back to the 50s, 60s, 70s, there was a much more you know....First of all, companies would ship products with service and repair manuals with detailed schematic diagrams with the understanding that owners would want to replace and service them. And what I would say is, yes, absolutely. I doubt very much. And I know we had members who were here in 1998 authoring the DMCA. I think if you had said to them, in 25 years time, this law will be used to prevent somebody with a broken dishwasher from getting that serviced by their local repair shop or by for fixing it themselves, this law will prevent them from doing that, I doubt very much they would have said, yeah, that's pretty much what we want. Rep. Darrell Issa (R-CA): Well, I will tell you that the I was the chairman of what is now the Consumer Electronics Association in 1998 and we did predict a lot of these items were going to be expanded beyond the scope of the original. Paul Roberts: Right now this is not an urgent issue, because most of the cars out there are older vehicles. As we move forward, as telematic systems evolve, as automakers continue their trend of moving more and more information to telematic systems, this is going to become a bigger problem. I'll point out another problem, which is the Massachusetts law is contingent on data transfers of diagnostic and repair information via the OBD or onboard diagnostic two port under the dashboard. That's only there because of federal Clean Air law. Electronic vehicles don't have that port because they don't have emissions, and so in the very near future, as we shift to electronic vehicles, that data access port will no longer be there. It will all be telematics data, and so the utility of the Massachusetts law is going to decline over time, going forward. And again, I you know, when you start talking about right to repair, you become like this crazy person who talks about right to repair every time it comes up. But one thing I try and stress to people when I talk to them about auto repair is, if you live in Michigan or California and you have taken your vehicle to the local independent repair shop, you have only done that because the voters in Massachusetts passed a ballot measure over a decade ago and then updated it in November 2020. That is the very thin thread that our right to use independent auto repair hangs by in this country. That's not the way it's supposed to be. This is something that affects vehicle owners, hundreds of millions of them in all 50 states. And it's a type of thing that the federal government needs to address with federal legislation. It should not hang by this very thin thread. 2:30:20 Rep. Hank Johnson (D-GA): Are software updates new creations, and thus copyrightable? Devlin Hartline: Software updates, yeah, they're computer programs, and so Congress said explicitly in 1980, but it was understood before then, that computer programs are literary works and they're protected, just like any other copyrighted work. Rep. Hank Johnson (D-GA): Thank you, Professor Perzanowski, do you disagree? Aaron Perzanowski: I don't disagree at all that software updates are protectable subject matter under the Copyright Act. But what I think is important to keep in mind right is the Copyright Act and copyrights exclusive rights, and all of the exceptions and limitations to copyrights exclusive rights are created by Congress, and so if you think those rights are interfering with other important issues and concerns, then I think Congress clearly has the power to make changes to the copyright law in order to best serve what you ultimately determine to be in the public interest. 2:35:30 Aaron Perzanowski: Access to firmware and other code is really essential to the functioning and repair of lots of devices. I think there's some important differences between the standard essential patent context and kind of what we're talking about here in that in the standard essential patent context, we're relying on standard setting bodies to identify technologies and to require companies to license their patents under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms. We don't quite have that infrastructure in place in the copyright context, but what we do have are compulsory licenses that exist within the Copyright Act already, one of which you were alluding to earlier, the mechanical license for musical works. We also have compulsory licenses for retransmissions of satellite and broadcast content that essentially say the copyright owner is entitled to compensation of some form, but they're not entitled to prevent people from using or accessing that underlying work, and I think that could be a useful framework here for getting owners of devices access to the firmware that they need. Music by Editing Production Assistance

On the ground coverage of the Democratic National Convention, which was not as joyful and unified as the party wanted it to seem. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Ballot Deadline Reuters Fact Check. July 30, 2024. Reuters. Biden’s Speech: Stop Arming Israel Banner C-SPAN. Democracy Now! on YouTube. Rep. Ro Khanna on the Young Turks The Young Turks (@TheYoungTurks). August 23, 2024. AIPAC Spending Joan E Greve et al. April 22, 2024. The Guardian. Gaza Death Toll Malak A Tantesh and Emma Graham-Harrison. August 15, 2024. The Guardian. Harris Speech August 22, 2024. C-SPAN. Music by Editing Production Assistance

The Senate recently received testimony from the bipartisan co-chairs of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy, who were tasked with creating a report to Congress with recommendations needed to adapt our National Defense Strategy to current threats. In this episode, hear the testimony about that completed report during which they discuss preparations for a possible world war and the need for more American kids to fight and die in it. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes The Report Jane Harman et al. July 2024. Senate Committee on Armed Services. Jane Harman: Warmonger Open Secrets. October 10, 2002. Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives. September 14, 2001. GovTrack. Iridium Communications April 2, 2024. wallmine. GuruFocus Research. March 8, 2024. Yahoo Finance. December 29, 2023. Market Screener. Bing. Iridium. Iridium. Iridium. Retrieved from the Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine version archived November 11, 2022. Axis of Aggression or Axis of Resistance? Angela Skujins. June 8, 2024. euronews. Nikita Smagin. June 15, 2023. Carnegie Politika. Defense Innovation Unit Defense Innovation Unit. Military Service Kristy N. Kamarck. December 13, 2016. Congressional Research Service. Christopher Hitchens. October 3, 2007. Vanity Fair. Mark Daily. Feb. 14, 2007. Los Angeles Times. Israel-Palestine Shay Fogelman. August 16, 2024. Haaretz. Steven Scheer and Ali Sawafta. August 14, 2024. Reuters. July 2, 2024. Al Mayadeen English. Steve Crawshaw. January 26, 2024. The Guardian. Patreon August 12, 2024. Patreon. C-SPAN Fundraiser C-SPAN. Bills: NDAA 2025 Audio Sources July 30, 2024 Senate Committee on Armed Services Witnesses: Jane M. Harman, Chair, Commission on the National Defense Strategy Eric S. Edelman, Vice Chair, Commission on the National Defense Strategy Clips 26:20 Sen. Roger Wicker (R-MS): The document details the way in which the 2022 National Defense Strategy and Assessment, completed just two years ago, did not adequately account for the threat of simultaneous and increasingly coordinated military action by our four primary adversaries. A group which I have come to call the Axis of Aggressors. Sen. Roger Wicker (R-MS): I appreciate the Commission's recommendation that national security spending must return to late Cold War levels — a goal which matches my plan to spend 5%, eventually, of GDP on defense. That level of investment would be temporary. It would be a down-payment on the rebuilding of our national defense tools for a generation. Tools that have sharpened can reduce the risk that our adversaries will use military force against US interests. 33:10 Jane Harman: The threats to US national security and our interests are greater than any time since World War II, and more complex than any threats during the Cold War. 34:00 Jane Harman: Sadly, we think, and I'm sure you agree, that the public has no idea how great the threats are and is not mobilized to meet them. Public support is critical to implement the changes we need to make. Leaders on both sides of the aisle and across government need to make the case to the public and get their support. Eric Edelman: There is potential for near-term war and a potential that we might lose such a conflict. The partnership that's emerged among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is a major strategic shift that we have not completely accounted for in our defense planning. It makes each of those countries potentially stronger militarily, economically, and diplomatically, and potentially can weaken the tools we have at our disposal to deal with them. And it makes it more likely that a future conflict, for instance, in the Indo-Pacific, would expand across other theaters and that we would find ourselves in a global war that is on the scale of the Second World War. Eric Edelman: The 2022 NDS identified China as the pacing challenge. We found that China is, in many ways, outpacing the US. While we still have the strongest military in the world with the farthest global reach, when we get to a thousand miles of China's shore, we start to lose our military dominance and could find ourselves on the losing end of a conflict. China's cyber capabilities, space assets, growing strategic forces, and fully modernized conventional forces are designed to keep us from engaging in the Taiwan Strait or the South or East China seas. China, as has been testified to before Congress, has infiltrated our critical infrastructure networks to prevent or deter US action by contesting our logistics, disrupting American power and water, and otherwise removing the sanctuary of the homeland that we have long enjoyed. 38:00 Eric Edelman: For its part, Russia has reconstituted its own defense industrial base after its invasion of Ukraine much more rapidly than people anticipated. Vladimir Putin seeks to reassert Russia as a great power and is happy to destabilize the world in order to do so. 38:15 Eric Edelman: Our report describes the threats posed by Iran, North Korea, and terrorism as well. Clearly, Iran and North Korea both feel emboldened by the current environment, and terrorism remains a potent threat fueled by the proliferation of technology. As the DNI has said, the current war in the Middle East is likely to have a generational impact on terrorism. 39:20 Jane Harman: First finding: DoD cannot and should not provide for the national defense by itself. The NDS calls for an integrated deterrence that is not reflected in practice today. A truly all elements of national power approach is required to coordinate and leverage resources across DoD, the rest of the Executive branch, the private sector, civil society, and US allies and partners. We agree with the NDS on the importance of allies, and we commend the administration for expanding and strengthening NATO and building up relationships and capabilities across Asia. We also point out ways for the United States to be better partners ourselves, including by maintaining a more stable presence globally and in key organizations like NATO. We call for reducing barriers to intelligence sharing, joint production, and military exports so we can better support and prepare to fight with our closest allies. 40:25 Jane Harman: Second recommendation is fundamental shifts in threats and technology require fundamental change in how DoD functions. This is particularly true of how DoD works with the tech sector, where most of our innovation happens. We say that DoD is operating at the speed of bureaucracy when the threat is approaching wartime urgency. DoD structure is optimized for research and development for exquisite, irreplaceable platforms when the future is autonomy, AI and large numbers of cheaper and attritable systems. I know this because I represented the Aerospace Center of Los Angeles in Congress for so many years, where exquisite, irreplaceable satellite platforms were built. And now we know that there is a plethora of commercial platforms that can do many of the same things and offer redundancy. DoD programs like Replicator and the Defense Innovation Unit and the Office of Strategic Capital are great, but they're essentially efforts to work around the larger Pentagon system. 42:00 Eric Edelman: Mr. Wicker, you raised the issue of the foresizing construct in your opening statement, and we, as you noted, found that it is inadequate. I mean, it was written actually before the invasion of Ukraine and before the emergence of this tightening alliance between Russia and China. And we propose that the force needs to be sized, the joint force, in conjunction with US allies and partners, to defend the homeland, but simultaneously be able to deal with threats in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. These are not all the same fights, so different elements of the force would be required in different parts of the globe, but US global responsibilities require a global military response as well as a diplomatic and economic one. 43:20 Eric Edelman: The DoD workforce and the all-volunteer force provide us with a kind of unmatched advantage, but recruiting failures have shrunk the force and have raised serious questions about the sustainability of the all-volunteer force in peacetime, let alone if we had to mobilize for a major conflict or a protracted conflict. 44:30 Jane Harman: Additionally, we think that Congress should revoke the 2023 spending caps and provide real growth — I know Senator Wicker loves this one — for fiscal year 2025 defense and non-defense national security spending that, at a bare minimum, falls within the range recommended by the 2018 NDS Commission. That range was never achieved. Subsequent budgets will require spending that puts defense and other components of national security, other components jointly across government and the tech sector and partners and allies, on a glide path to support efforts commensurate with the US national efforts seen during the Cold War. Jane Harman: We agree on a unanimous basis that the national debt is its own national security challenge. If we want to approach Cold War levels of spending, we need to increase resources and reform entitlement spending. 45:40 Jane Harman: During the Cold War, top marginal income tax rates were above 70% and corporate tax rates averaged 50%. We don't call for those numbers, but we are calling for an increase in resources and point out that interest on the debt is higher than our total top line of defense spending. 49:55 Jane Harman: The notion of public service isn't new as you know, Mr. Chairman, it's been around for years. It was around when I served in Congress, and Congress did not act on any of the proposals that I saw. It is still a way to get all of the public, at the proper age, engaged in understanding the requirements of citizenship. A lot of our young people have no earthly idea, sadly, because they have no civic education, what our government really is and what are the ways to serve. And surely one of the most honorable ways to serve is as a member of the military, you did it, and other members of this committee have done this. And I think that is the way to revive a kind of sense of coherence and patriotism that we are lacking right now. Eric Edelman: We have not really, as a society, talked about the need for national mobilization, but if the worst were to happen and some of the worst scenarios we discuss in our report were to come to pass and were we to face a global conflict, it would require mobilization on the scale of what we did as a nation during World War II. And we haven't done that in a long time. We haven't thought about that in a long time. There are a lot of elements to it, including stockpiling strategic materials, but being able to rapidly bring people into the military, et cetera, I just don't think we are prepared to do it. I think we have to have a national discussion about this, and I think it goes hand in hand with the earlier discussion you had with my colleague about public service and serving the nation. 52:05 Sen. Jack Reed (D-RI): We had in World War II, two years, essentially from September 1st, 1939 to December 7th, 1941, to prepare. And I doubt we'll have two years to prepare in this environment. Eric Edelman: President Putin, in some ways, has done us a bit of a favor by having invaded Ukraine and exposed, as a result, some of the limitations of US defense industrial production, and shown that it's grossly inadequate to provide the equipment, technology, and munitions that the US military and our allies and partners need today, let alone given the demands of a potential future conflict, which might be even more taxing. Jane Harman: I remember being a member of the Defense Policy Board when Jim Mattis was Secretary of Defense, and his piece of advice to us was, let's do everything we can to keep Russia and China apart. Well, oops, that has not happened. And there is this close friendship and collaboration between them. You asked how is it manifested? Well, we see it most at the moment in Ukraine, where Russia was the aggressor violating international law and invading Ukraine, and China is a huge help to Russia in evading our sanctions by buying Russian gas and by its efforts to ship into China material for the war. And then you add in, as you mentioned, Iran and North Korea, which are suppliers of drones and other lethal material to Russia. And this unholy alliance, or I think you call it Alliance of Aggression, is extremely dangerous. Let's remember that both North Korea has nuclear weapons, Iran is at breakout for nuclear weapons, and the other two countries are nuclear countries. And where this goes is, it seems to me, terrifying. And that is, again, why we need to leverage all elements of national power to make sure we deter these countries from acting against us. Eric Edelman: Ukraine offered to give up, and I was involved in some of the diplomacy of this back in the nineties, the nuclear weapons that were left on its territory after the end of the Soviet Union. As a result of that, Ukraine gave them up, but in exchange for assurances from the United States, Russia, Great Britain and France, that its territorial integrity would be recognized along the borderlines that existed before the 2014 seizure of Crimea by Putin, which was a violation of those undertakings. If our assurances in the non-proliferation realm in this instance are shown to be hollow, it will raise questions in the minds of all of our allies about the assurances we've given them, our extended deterrent assurances, whether it's for our allies in Europe, part of our multilateral NATO alliance, or our bilateral allies in East Asia, or our partners, parts of special relationships we've developed in Middle East with Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt and others. So the whole fabric, frankly, of the international order is at risk here, depending on the outcome in Ukraine. And to your point, if Putin is successful in Ukraine, the lesson that Xi Jinping is likely to draw is that he too can be successful in Taiwan or in the East China Sea or the South China Sea. Eric Edelman: Nuclear deterrence, Senator Fisher, is the fundamental on which everything else is built in terms of our national security. It's operating every day. It's not visible to American citizens, but the fact of our nuclear deterrent force, all three legs of the triad being available is the most powerful deterrent that we have to conflict. It's not sufficient, but it is the absolute basis, and we really, I think, agreed with the conclusion our colleagues on the Strategic Posture Commission reached, which is that we have to move forward with alacrity on all the elements of modernization of the nuclear triad. That's the GBSD Sentinel Program, that is the B-21, that is the Ohio replacement class. All of those things have to be accomplished and there are problems. One of the reasons we highlighted education is that some of the problems that GBSD are running into have to do with lack of skilled workers to be able to pour the kind of special reinforced concrete that you need for the new silos for missiles, the new control systems for missiles. We lack welders in the submarine industrial base, as Senator Wicker knows well. So there's a lot that has to be done across the board in order to move forward with nuclear modernization, but it is absolutely fundamental to our ability to deter aggression against our allies and of course against the homeland. Eric Edelman: The force right now is too small, and so we have to grow the force, and that's in the face of the recruiting challenges that we've highlighted in the report that the Army in particular, but also the Navy and the Air Force have faced. Sen. Deb Fischer (R-NE): And I'm going to interrupt you. Please. Why is it too small? Can you explain in this setting the threats that we are facing when we look at the adversaries that we face and how that has changed over the last decade? Eric Edelman: It's too small, in part because the Department was sizing itself for one conflict. But if you have to be present in three theaters, as we are now, we've got conflicts in two theaters now, if we have a third conflict in the third theater, it's going to require a lot more forces. People talk, for instance, about the Indo-Pacific being largely a Navy and Air Force fight. That's correct, but the logistics that support the Navy and the Air Force will largely be manned by the Army. And so we have to have an Army that is sufficiently large that it can operate in all of these places, potentially simultaneously, because honestly, it is very hard to imagine today a conflict in the Indo-Pacific that doesn't become a global conflict very quickly. Someone asked earlier in the hearing about cooperation between Russia and China. The last time I testified before this committee was two years ago about the so-called "Three Body Problem," Russia and China being both nuclear peers of the United States. And one of the criticisms that was leveled at my colleague, Frank Miller and me, was that, well, there's no evidence that Russia and China are collaborating in the nuclear area. Well, we just saw them flying strategic bombers together up near Alaska, so I don't know what more evidence you want that they're beginning to collaborate in that strategic area. Eric Edelman: If we got into some kind of conflict in the Indo-Pacific, whether it be over Taiwan or the South China Sea or East China Sea, what might Russia do? One thing that comes to mind is take advantage of the separatist movement in Moldova to move on Moldova, a country that's trying to move closer to the European Union and to the West, which would then precipitate additional conflict in Europe, or take advantage of the ethnic Russian speaking minorities in the Baltic states, say Latvia, to initiate a conflict there. How would we manage that? When you raise that question with Department [of Defense] leaders, they basically say, well, that — to go back to the chairman's point earlier — well that would be sort of like World War II or would require national mobilization, and that's correct, but we haven't really taken the next steps to really focus on what that and what a protracted conflict would actually look like. We're optimized to fight very short wars. 1:21:00 Sen. Mike Rounds (R-SD): There are five different domains in which our country will be attacked in the future. Air, land, and sea, most people would understand, but space and cyberspace are the new domains, which will precede any attack on the first three. Jane Harman: On cyber, it's a huge threat and I don't think we minimize it in any way. One of the things we might anticipate, for example, is if China decides to annex Taiwan, or whatever euphemism they might use, they might engage in a major cyber attack here first, for which we are under-prepared, a cyber attack of our infrastructure. When I was in Congress, I represented the Port of Los Angeles, which with the Port of Long Beach is the largest container port complex in the country. 50% of our container traffic enters and exits through those ports. There are cranes on the port to move the cargo, and those cranes have Chinese technology. So guess what? Sen. Mike Rounds (R-SD): All of which are subject to the possibilities of cyber attack. Jane Harman: Absolutely. We should anticipate that our ports could go down. Sen. Mike Rounds (R-SD): Throughout our entire society, we find that to be the case though. Jane Harman: I'm agreeing with you and this is devastating. Does the American public understand this? No. Jane Harman: You also mentioned space. Again, something I know something about, since I used to call my district the aerospace center of the universe, where most of our intelligence satellites were made. We are more dependent on space as a country and more vulnerable in space because of that dependency than any other country. Shoring up space, which is one of the threats we address, is absolutely crucial. And it's not just military space, but commercial space. You talked about communication. A lot of how we communicate is through commercial space and think how inconvenienced the public would be if all of a sudden their little devices, which we're all dependent on, didn't work. Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-AL): What's hurting us too is a lot of our government schools, I call 'em government schools because I went in thousands of them while I was coaching, recruiting, and the problem we have is hate that's being taught in a lot of our government schools, towards our country. Why would any young man or woman want to fight for a country that they don't believe in, that they're being taught to hate? It's absolutely amazing to me the direction this country is going. So is there any agreement there, Representative Harman? Jane Harman: There is agreement there. I think hate on both sides is totally destructive. I think the absence of civics education and the absence of institutions that help people understand what patriotism means. We had a conversation about national service, which might be a way to get all of our youth back together. I mean, this country sadly, is in a point where many people say our biggest enemy is us fighting each other. 1:33:35 Jane Harman: One of the problems is the kind of deployments the military does every two years. Moving somewhere where in many cases the spouse works and having to change his or her job every two years is very burdensome. It's also hard on kids, and so that could change. 1:36:20 Eric Edelman: The BRICS was actually kind of an invention of Goldman Sachs. It's not really a serious military organization. Jane Harman: But I think that Congress is somewhat complicit in the way the budget process doesn't work, and this insistence on requirements and oversight rather than on what is the problem set we are solving for, which is how the tech sector thinks. I've been making a comment about DIU, the Defense Innovation Unit, that was set up by the late Secretary Ash Carter, that maybe we should outsource the Pentagon to DIU, which is ably headed by someone named Doug Beck, who had 11 years experience in the private sector, because they know how to think about this. I couldn't agree with you more. The budget of DIU is $1 billion out of $850 billion. Doug Beck says he can leverage that. Sen. Angus King (I-ME): It's technologies that win wars, new technology, right? Jane Harman: I'm in violent agreement with you. He says he can leverage that into $50 billion of commercial investment, but that's still a pittance compared to the kind of change we need to undergo. Not just at the Pentagon, but at the Pentagon lashed up with other government agencies, with the tech sector, and with partners and allies. That is our point about all elements of national power, which will win the next war. 1:42:55 Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR): Ambassador Edelman, you spoke with Senator Fischer about the multiple theater force construct. Basically the kind of threats we're planning for, and there's a time when this nation planned to fight two major wars at a time, and I think now we're down to a force that can fight one conflict and protect our homeland, and hopefully scare bad guys everywhere else around the world and not starting war. Is that right? Eric Edelman: That is correct. That's what the 2022 NDS describes. Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR): So that's what our national Defense Strategy says. Is the current force even capable of doing that, in your opinion? Putting aside what it should be capable of doing, which I'll come to momentarily. Can it even do that? Eric Edelman: I think there are very serious questions about whether the force in being could actually execute the strategy. Jane Harman: The word pivot probably should be retired. I don't think we can leave anywhere. I think we have to have an understanding of the threats against us, not just against regions, everywhere. The whole idea of this multiple force construct is flexibility and having an adequate deterrence so we don't engage in more wars. Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV): In your report you talked about the current force structure that we have, and I think you had identified that the Marines are only ones meeting that. We agree with that. What you failed to do is basically identify why we have not, or why you all did not, take up women being in selective service or joining selective service, because women make up 74% of the healthcare and education industry, 52% of financial activities. They're a tremendously strong force. And there's a lot of women I don't want to go up against. I can tell you that in so many ways. I guess my question is simple. Does the commission support women registering for selective service? Jane Harman: Well, I'll speak for myself. I do. I think that women are, a majority of our population, a majority of the talent pool, many of the most talented women serve on this committee. So yes, they should be. We should be. Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV): I'll make it clear that what we talked about does not require women to participate in military draft. Jane Harman: I understand. It's registering. Sen. Joe Manchin (D-WV): Yeah, registering, that's all. Jane Harman: And my answer to that is yes. Eric Edelman: Our view was that you have to be able to deter and potentially defeat adversaries in all three of the main theaters that we have been engaged in since the end of the Second World War, and which we repeatedly engaged in. I mean, there's been no shortage of efforts to try and extricate the United States from the Middle East. The last NDS in 2018 said we should be willing to run risk in the Middle East. I think on October 7th we got a sense, and then again on April 13th, of what running additional risk means in the Middle East. So it's our view that we have to be able to manage to do all of those things. Eric Edelman: The homeland, if there's a conflict, is not going to be a sanctuary anymore. And the first attacks will likely be in the cyber domain, and they will be incredibly disabling for our society, but also for the department. But getting all of the agencies of government that would have a role in all this, because it goes beyond just DoD, it goes beyond just DHS, I mean, it goes to the Department of Transportation, it goes to Commerce. I mean, it's an unbelievably complex issue. And we're only now wrapping our minds around it and it needs a lot more work and attention from the department. Jane Harman: The public is essentially clueless about the massive cyber attacks that could be launched any day by our adversaries, not just nation states, but rogue actors as well. Music by Editing Production Assistance

When Congress returned to work after the Republican National Convention, the House held three hearings investigating the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump. In this episode, hear for yourself the facts presented by the Director of the Secret Service, the Pennsylvania State Police Commissioner, and the FBI Director during their 15 hours of testimony. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes Cheatle’s Failures Rep. James Comer and Rep. Jamie Raskin. July 22, 2024. House Committee on Oversight and Accountability. Julia Reinstein et al. July 16, 2024. ABC News. Would-be Assassin Emily Cochrane et al. July 19, 2024. The New York Times. Bernd Debusmann et al. July 19, 2024. BBC. Gaza Death Toll Rasha Khatib. July 20, 2024. The Lancet, Volume 404, Issue 10449. Audio Sources July 24, 2024 House Committee on the Judiciary Witnesses: Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Clips Time stamps correspond to C-SPAN version 31:20 Christopher Wray: I'm told that the father purchased the firearm in 2013, so quite a while ago, and then he sold it to his son in October of 2023. 43:05 Christopher Wray: The reason why I've talked about how we think he got on the roof is that's based our evidence response to forensic analysis. Without getting into all the details, footprints, fingerprints, et cetera, that we can see how he got on. But we don't have an eyewitness at the moment who saw him climbing up. 43:25 Christopher Wray: A few minutes before the shooting, local law enforcement saw him on the roof. Again, no weapon identified at that point. A few seconds before the shooting is when the law enforcement officer that I've talked about already, the one who was assisted by another officer who saw up on the roof, saw the shooter in a prone shooting position with the gun. He turns… Rep. Barry Moore (R-AL): How long did that happen before? Christopher Wray: That sighting, that is the first time, to my knowledge, the first time anybody from law enforcement saw him with a weapon. That is seconds before he shot at President Trump. July 24, 2024 House Committee on the Judiciary Witnesses: Christopher Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Clips Time stamps correspond to C-SPAN version 25:30 Christopher Wray: We have recovered eight cartridges on the roof. 28:05 Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Have you developed any evidence to so suggest that there are any accomplices or cooperators or assisters? Christopher Wray: Not at this time, but again, the investigation is ongoing. 36:10 Christopher Wray: So we have recovered a drone that the shooter appears to have used. It's being exploited and analyzed by the FBI lab. The drone was recovered in his vehicle, so at the time of the shooting, the drone was in his vehicle with the controller. In addition, our investigation has uncovered -- Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Do you know what time of day he flew it and if he flew it on the day of the shooting? Christopher Wray: So in addition, it appears that around 3:50-4:00PM, in that window, on the day of the shooting, that the shooter was flying the drone around the area. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Two hours before? Christopher Wray: I want to be clear about when I say the area, not over the stage and that part of the area itself, but I would say about 200 yards, give or take, away from that, we think, but we do not know. So again, this is one of these things that's qualified because of our ongoing review, that he was live streaming, viewing the footage from that. Again, about 11 minutes and around the 3:50-4:00 PM range. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Two hours before, he's flying a drone in the vicinity of the rally. Christopher Wray: About 200 yards away, yes. 37:25 Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): What about the bombs that we've heard about in the shooter's car? Christopher Wray: So again, the FBI lab is exploiting those explosive devices. We've recovered three devices, two in his vehicle and one back in his residence. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Are these what your experts would call sophisticated operations? I dunno. That's what I've been told by people who have some understanding of this area. Christopher Wray: Yeah, I think we've seen more sophisticated and less, I would say these are relatively, again, keyword relatively, crude devices themselves, but they did have the ability to be detonated remotely. And so to that point, in addition to the two devices that we recovered out of his vehicle, there were receivers for those two explosive devices with the devices. And then on the shooter himself, when he was killed by law enforcement, he had a transmitter with him. Now, I do want to add one important point here. At the moment, it looks to us, again, ongoing review, and I can't say that too many times, at the moment, it looks like because of the off position on the receivers, that if he had tried to detonate those devices from the roof, it would not have worked. But that doesn't mean the explosives weren't dangerous. 1:23:00 Christopher Wray: I think it's fair to say that we do not yet have a clear picture of his motive. 1:25:30 Christopher Wray: We located a number of firearms associated with the shooter and his family. I think it was a total of, I think 14 in the house. The weapon that he used for the attempted assassination was an AR-style rifle that was purchased legally that he, its my understanding, acquired, I think bought actually from his father, who was the one who originally bought it, again, legally. 1:46:20 Christopher Wray: So we do know that he purchased a ladder. I think if I recall correctly, it was about a five foot tall type of ladder. But importantly, we did not find the ladder at the scene. So it's not clear that he used the ladder to get on top of the roof. 1:52:40 Christopher Wray: The weapon had a collapsible stock, which could explain why it might've been less easy for people to observe, because one of the things that we're finding is people have observed him. The first people to observe him with the weapon were when he was already on the roof, and we haven't yet found anybody with firsthand observation of him with the weapon walking around beforehand. 1:54:00 Christopher Wray: There were no pictures or videos on the drone of the day of the rally, for example. But we have been able to reverse engineer the flight path of the drone from the day of the rally, and that's how we know that for about 11 minutes from, I think it's around 3:50 PM to 4:00 PM, somewhere in that range, he was flying the drone and we have the flight path, and it's about 200 yards away from where former President Trump would ultimately be speaking. And so that would've primarily given him a vantage point. I'm trying to think how to describe this. If the former President's podium is that way, the drone would be over here looking, say 200 yards again, off this way, looking back, so it would've shown the shooter -- we think, again, we're still doing more work on this. I really want to qualify what I'm saying, but I'm trying to be transparent and lean in here -- we think it would've shown him kind of what would've been behind him. Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ): When you say behind him, behind the shooter. Christopher Wray: Correct. In other words, almost like giving him a rear view mirror of the scene behind him, except again, he wasn't flying it overhead while he was later back for the assassination. Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ): But he would've had, with the drone, he would've been able to also assess, because the stage, I assume, was already set, he'd be able to assess that angle with rooftop as well, forward and backward, I assume. Christopher Wray: Well, certainly going towards the podium, again, we're still trying to figure out exactly what he saw, because having to, in effect, because there's no recording of what he saw during those 11 minutes, our hypothesis at this point, the experts think he would've been live streaming it, and so we're trying to, in effect say, okay, well this was the flight pattern. Given these capabilities of the drone, what would you have seen? What could you have seen for those 11 minutes? And again, it wasn't over the stage or kind of the hub of the rally. It was about 200 yards away, but it looks like it would've been looking, let's say, the length of a football field or so more towards the podium. 1:56:25 Christopher Wray: So again, with the caveat that we're continued to do work on it, we believe that the first time he traveled to the grounds was I think a week before and he spent roughly 20 minutes there. Then he went to the grounds again on the morning of the event. It appears for about 70 minutes, I think. But again, I qualify that. I'd have to go back and look to be sure of that part. And then he came back in the afternoon. So that would be, I guess a third time for good. But that included things like this drone activity we just talked about. 1:58:10 Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA): Have you been able to gain access to the shooter's electronic communications, social media, and -- with the caveats that you mentioned that the investigation is still early -- have you been able to make any deductions or are there any indications of the shooter's motivation from those electronic holdings? Christopher Wray: So in terms of our ability to access it, we have been able to get into and exploit a number of electronic devices, digital devices, but not all of them yet. And then within his various accounts, we've been able to get access to some of them, but some of them we're still waiting on. Some of them we may never get access to because of the encryption issue. It presents an increasingly vexing barrier for law enforcement, not just the FBI, but for law enforcement all over the country. 1:59:30 Christopher Wray: It does appear fairly clear that he was interested in public figures kind of more broadly, and I think this is important, that starting somewhere around July 6th or so, he became very focused on former President Trump, on this rally. And so one of the things that I can share here today that has not been shared yet is that we've just in the last couple of days, found that from our review, to your point about devices, analysis of a laptop, that the investigation ties to the shooter reveals that on July 6th he did a Google search for "how far away was Oswald from Kennedy." And so that search obviously is significant in terms of his state of mind. That is the same day that it appears that he registered for the Butler rally. 2:15:30 Christopher Wray: So I know it was a Secret Service counter sniper who took the shot that eliminated the shooter. 2:15:50 Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY): You mentioned that the would-be assassin bought a five foot ladder, you have credit card evidence of that. But it looks like on the scene there was a larger ladder that he might've used. Do you know which ladder he used to get to the roof? And do you have possession of that five foot ladder and the other ladder? And do you know how the taller ladder got to the scene? Christopher Wray: So this whole business about the ladder is something we're drilling into more. We do have possession of the five foot ladder that he purchased close in time to his attempted assassination that we've traced the purchase of that ladder from a receipt, a bloodied receipt that he had on him at the time his body was recovered on the roof. We do not yet know for sure how exactly he got up on the roof. We're looking at various forensic pieces to try to kind of piece that together. So more to come on that. Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY): Do you know where the five foot ladder was found or retrieved? Was it near the roof or was it still in his vehicle? Christopher Wray: Neither. I don't have it in front of me, but I know that it was not, I know that it was not on scene and I know that it was not in his vehicle. 2:17:55 Christopher Wray: From everything we've seen, which is consistent with what we've learned in interviews, a lot of people describe him as a loner. That does kind of fit with what we're seeing in his devices. His list of contacts, for example, is very short compared to what you would normally see from most people. So it doesn't appear to be a whole lot of interaction between him, face-to-face or digital, with a lot of people. 3:00:50 Christopher Wray: We now believe that the subject climbed onto the roof using some mechanical equipment on the ground and vertical piping on the side of the AGR building. In other words, we do not believe he used a ladder to get up there. 3:07:25 Christopher Wray: He was a fairly, avid might be a little strong, but a fairly avid shooting hobbyist, and so he belonged to different clubs and went to certain ranges and that kind of thing. We do believe, based on what we've seen so far, that he went to a shooting range the day before and that he shot an AR-style rifle at that range the day before. I am not sure we know for sure that it's the weapon that he used, but I think we assessed that it probably is. July 23, 2024 House Committee on Homeland Security Witnesses: Colonel Christopher L. Paris, Commissioner, Pennsylvania State Police Patrick Yoes, National President, Fraternal Order of Police Clips Time stamps correspond to YouTube version 23:35 Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Colonel Christopher Paris serves as the commissioner for the Pennsylvania State Police. In this role, he exercises command, administrative and fiscal authority over the Pennsylvania State Police, the 10th largest police agency in the United States. Commissioner Paris has served in the Pennsylvania State Police since his enlistment in 1999. 23:55 Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Mr. Patrick Yoes currently serves as the president National Fraternal Order of Police. In this role, Mr. Yoes leads the order and its more than 367,000 law enforcement members in representing police officers in the profession. Prior to taking his current role, Mr. Yoes served an impressive 36 years as an active law enforcement officer. 25:45 Col. Christopher L. Paris: Prior to the shooting, our role was to support the Secret Service with personnel and assets that they requested. Our operation plan, completed to fulfill this responsibility consisted of 32 members, and we had two main responsibilities, a motorcade operation for the transportation with the Secret Service of former President Trump, as well as manning and staffing security posts inside the secure area of the Butler County Farm Show. Additionally, we provided two marked cars with uniformed troopers outside of the secure perimeter to provide roving duties, as the name implies, responding to incidents that may occur as a large gathering of people were moving to the venue. 1:22:10 Col. Christopher L. Paris: I would say from my experience and from state police operations to include this event as planned in our operations plan, we had integrated communications by having RPSP personnel in the Secret Service Command post. Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): So your person was in there, in that command post on this event? Col. Christopher L. Paris: Yes, sir. 1:22:45 Col. Christopher L. Paris: There's a lot of talk about interoperability and communications. The state police, for example, operate our own statewide radio network, so we have the ability to, if we have an incident, a long protracted incident, for example, where we need to patch other agencies in, we have the capability to do that. However, Secret Service, for example, maintain some additional encrypted communications. So the best way to integrate unified command… Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Is physically present in the command site. Col. Christopher L. Paris: That would be our, yeah. Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): That's how the Army does it and the military Col. Christopher L. Paris: I would expect our commanders to have personnel in there so that we could have radio communication, as well as a redundancy in the operations plan with a telephonic backup. 1:25:30 Col. Christopher L. Paris: The final walkthrough occurred on the 11th. Present at that meeting were the two commanders that were tasked with both staffing the security checkpoints on the interior of the secure perimeter, as well as the commander who was going to be in charge of the motorcade. But in addition to that, a PSP area commander was on that walkthrough, holding the rank of Major. Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Could you share a little bit of insight? I appreciate the timeline, but could you share a little bit specific to the AGR building? Col. Christopher L. Paris: So on that walkthrough, our area commander asked specifically who was responsible for the AGR building, and we were told that Butler ESU was responsible for that area by several Secret Service agents on that walkthrough. 1:26:35 Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): The slope of the roof, would that have prevented a sniper from being up there? Col. Christopher L. Paris I don't believe so, sir. Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Okay. 1:29:40 Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS): President Yoes, in your comments, you talked about the need for communication. You talked about FirstNet. We have federal, state, and local law enforcement at an event like what we're talking about in Butler, but in our conversation with some of the locals, not state police, but the sheriff's department and the chief of police in Butler yesterday, those individuals did not have communication with state police or Secret Service. Would that, in your professional opinion, be a vulnerability for managing an event like this? Patrick Yoes: Well, I think we can go back to 9/11. When we identified at that time that the inoperability of different agencies to be able to communicate really was a hindrance. There's an infrastructure in place now to address these inoperabilities, but at the same time, they're not always utilized in every event. I do not have any direct knowledge whether that was the issue here, but I can tell you it is a common issue in law enforcement and an ability for our agencies not to be able to communicate, not that the technology is not necessarily there, it's because that they're not always incorporated. 1:31:10 Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS): Yeah, we passed legislation mandating, obviously, FirstNet interoperability, and we tied funding to make sure that that happens. But here we are looking at this situation and we picked up some valuable information that we are still not where we need to be on that. 1:32:25 Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-MS): Butler, Pennsylvania has no permitting process for events of that size, so you can announce it and hold it, and local government doesn't really have anything to do with it. And we were assured by local government that they would try to fix that. They said, we have to be more involved in events of this size, so that if this was not the best venue, then that permitting could have gotten engaged and suggested an alternate venue. 1:42:25 Rep. Eric Swalwell (D-CA): How many rounds did the shooter fire before he was killed? Do you know? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I believe that the number is eight casings have been recovered. 1:55:05 Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Colonel Paris, are you aware whether any law enforcement officer or officers was or were posted in the second floor window of the AGR building? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I am aware, yes, sir. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): And what is the answer? Col. Christopher L. Paris: To my knowledge, there were two posted there from Butler ESU. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): And you said Butler ESU. What does the acronym ESU stand for? Col. Christopher L. Paris: Emergency Services Unit. It's a team that's comprised of multiple agencies that pool resources on a county or several county basis in order to enhance capabilities and training and be able to respond. Basically a mutual aid agreement is my understanding of it. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Is it sort of like a SWAT team? Col. Christopher L. Paris They are trained in SWAT tactics, to my knowledge, yes. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): So how many ESU officers were posted to that second floor window? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I am aware that two were in the building, but again, I have not seen the Secret Service operations plan. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Do you know, you say in the building, were they in a window? A window out onto the scene? Col. Christopher L. Paris: From briefings that I have been given, I was told they were in a window, yes, sir. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Did they remain on Post? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I was told that at a certain point they began searching along with other local officers in the immediacy after Crooks had been identified as suspicious by them. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): By them? Col. Christopher L. Paris: My understanding is that they identified Crooks for not matriculating. To my knowledge, Crooks never made it through the Secure Perimeter into the venue space itself. He was identified by those members as suspicious in part because of that. And then at some point he produced the range finder, which heightened that. 1:57:30 Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Was it from this vantage point that those ESU officers spotted Crooks? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I don't know that particular window, but my understanding is from a second story window is where he was initially spotted. 1:57:45 Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): So are you then saying that, to your knowledge, those ESU officers left the location where they could look out the window to go in search of this person? Col. Christopher L. Paris: That is my understanding. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): So sometime between the time he was spotted on the ground and identified as someone suspicious until the shooting, they had left that post to go look for him. Is that what you're saying? Col. Christopher L. Paris: My understanding is yes. Along with other municipal officers that responded to that area. And that's based on interviews that we've conducted. And I want to be very clear that I don't want to establish a timeline minute by minute because we don't have that yet. 2:35:40 Col. Christopher L. Paris: So this goes to my earlier qualifier about the timeline, but my understanding of the sequence of events is that he was determined to be suspicious as a result of behavior that he was exhibiting, milling around that area in front of the AGR building. There was a text thread that was going, I've been briefed, between the ESU members. They identified, they took a photo of him at some point. When he utilized the rangefinder, the suspicion was heightened. So I know at a certain point in the command post, a member of PSP received a phone call and a text message from members of ESU, and I know from an interview that that was immediately relayed in the command post to the Secret Service. 2:36:35 Col. Christopher L. Paris: When the PSP member received that information and verbally turned right around, gave it to the Secret Service, our member was provided with a number to which the picture that had been taken by the Butler ESU members, or that was on that group thread, to which that should be sent. Our member did that, and our understanding was that was some element of the Secret Service. 2:37:50 Col. Christopher L. Paris: But at that point, just to be clear, he was determined to be suspicious. There was no information that he possessed a weapon. He was outside of that building where the ESU was posted. They were being vigilant. It's, I think, relevant that there were other people at the venue who were suspicious and reported likewise, in a close temporal nexus to that as well. 2:38:35 Col. Christopher L. Paris: I believe, again, I'll defer to when the President came out. I know that that was probably 20 to 25 minutes before 18:11 hours and steps were taken by the municipal officers over in that area, they were actively looking for Crooks. You saw the building yesterday. That's a pretty wide footprint. They began looking for him. There were scores of people making their way across that facility. Again, just for some context, there were over a hundred people that day requiring medical attention due to the heat. There was a missing 6-year-old. This individual was deemed to be suspicious because he was walking around and not moving into the venue. The rangefinder obviously heightened that, and they were attempting to locate him as people were moving across that space, who were attending the event, to the secure perimeter. 2:41:10 Rep. Dan Goldman (D-NY): You said that many of your officers, or Butler ESU officers, were looking for Crooks. That was after that photograph was relayed to the Secret Service? Col. Christopher L. Paris: My understanding is it was after the photo was relayed to our trooper in the command post. And yes, Crooks was in that area around the building. My understanding is two additional municipal officers who were on a different post responded to that area and they began actively looking for Crooks. They circumscribed the building to try and locate him. It became apparent at some point that he was up on the roof. Those two municipal officers who responded then, to their credit, actively, once they realized that he was on the roof, one boosted the other one up hanging from the ledge of the roof. By the time that officer was boosted up on top of the roof, Crooks was on it almost in that final position that you saw. He had the AR out and he pointed it at the municipal officer who was suspended from the roof, who was not in a position, feet dangling at that point, to draw a weapon or continue hoisting himself back up on the roof. He drops back down from the roof, and at this point, I believe, that's when the video that's been widely circulated with people filming Crooks up on the roof saying there's somebody up on the roof. There were other law enforcement around the building running, but their vantage point on the ground did not lend a clear line of sight to where Crooks was at the top of that building. 2:44:35 Col. Christopher L. Paris: The hoisting up of the officer occurred probably no more -- again, I'm going to give you a time, but I want to just put it in context -- Rep. Dan Goldman (D-NY) We understand it's not specific. Col. Christopher L. Paris: -- of a sequence of events. I would say at most two and a half to three minutes before that first shot rang out. 2:45:00 Col. Christopher L. Paris: The municipal officer saw Crooks. Crooks saw him, and Crooks turned and leveled the gun at him in a position tactically of extreme disadvantage, suspended in the air with your legs dangling after somebody had boosted you up. Rep. Dan Goldman (D-NY): And he let go, right? Col. Christopher L. Paris: He let go and he fell back down. 2:48:30 Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA): Now emergency services noticed Thomas Crooks on the roof -- this is the timeline that we have -- took a picture and reported it. Who did they send that picture to? Col. Christopher L. Paris: Just to be clear, they were posted in the AGR building and took a picture of him. That's what you're referring to. Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA): Yes, who did they send the picture to? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I only know from interviews what I can confirm to my knowledge and belief here today, that a member of Pennsylvania State Police inside of the command post received that information telephonically and by text, relayed it to the Secret Service, and then was given a number to follow up on and that was based, again, heightened suspicion. Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-GA): How did they relay it to Secret Service? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I believe that they verbally turned and said in the command post, this is information that I just received. And then in follow up to that, as directed from the interview that I was briefed on, that was forwarded by text as requested by the Secret Service. 2:56:10 Rep. Nick LaLota (R-NY): Were there other folks who were also in the crowd identified as suspicious by law enforcement? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I have been briefed that yes, there were multiple individuals, which would be consistent with normal operations for a detail like this, that are identified as suspicious. Rep. Nick LaLota (R-NY): Can we take that as a single digit number of other folks? Col. Christopher L. Paris: The number that I was briefed on was single digit, but I can't say definitively that I was -- Rep. Nick LaLota (R-NY): What number were you briefed on, Colonel? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I believe I was briefed on an additional three individuals. 3:03:25 Col. Christopher L. Paris: I'm aware of three radio systems in operation: PSP's, the Secret Service, and Butler County's. Rep. Morgan Luttrell (R-TX): All communicating on different channels. Col. Christopher L. Paris: Technically, yes, but, I can only speak from PSP, our integration occurs by us having somebody inside of the Secret Service Command post. Again, for an incident of this magnitude, in theory, the more people you have on the same channel, if there was a medical emergency or a lost 6-year-old and everybody keys up at once, it paralyzes your communication. 3:14:45 Rep. Rob Menendez (D-NJ): From the time that a law enforcement officer was hoisted up, was identified by the shooter, the shooter turns his rifle on him, how long between that encounter and the first shot? Col. Christopher L. Paris: So, I'm glad you asked me that question, Congressman. I'd like to clarify. So it was a matter of seconds. Rep. Rob Menendez (D-NJ): Alright, because I think earlier it might've been minutes. Col. Christopher L. Paris: Correct, and I appreciate you asking that question, you allowing me to clarify that on the record. When I assigned that number, which again, I don't want get locked into a timeline, of three minutes before, that's probably a total amount of time that he was on the roof. When the one local officer hoisted the other one up and subsequently falls, releases himself after being faced with that -- Rep. Rob Menendez (D-NJ): The shooter shuffles across the roof and takes his first shot -- Col. Christopher L. Paris: He's already, I believe, close to being in his final position there, and I'm told it's again, sequence of events, not a timeline based on the prior criteria laid out, but seconds after that is when the first shots rang out. 3:24:20 Patrick Yoes: There's no doubt when you look at how many people are involved in an operation like this, having everyone on one channel is difficult. But there are people within contained areas and their ability to be able to communicate as things change across platforms is crucial. In this case, we know that in seconds things unfolded and in seconds getting meaningful communication out to people who might be able to act on that communication is vital. So I think there's avenues here. I agree that not everyone should be on the same channel, but there are certain people within certain areas and perimeters that should be having communication or the ability to communicate a little more freer. 3:37:20 Rep. Eli Crane (R-AZ): Now that you've had a chance to go back and look over it, what is the tallest structure on that site? Col. Christopher L. Paris: The water tower, sir. Rep. Eli Crane (R-AZ): Absolutely. Colonel, do you know how far the water tower was from the roof where the shooter took his shots? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I do not. Rep. Eli Crane (R-AZ): 160 yards, sir. Who made the decision, Colonel, not to put a counter sniper team on the tallest structure by far on the site with 360 degree surveillance? Do you have any idea? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I do not know, sir. Rep. Eli Crane (R-AZ): Okay. We'd like to get that answer. 4:02:55 Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Was Secret Service notified that they were leaving to go look for this guy and thus those eyes on top of the building gone? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I do not know. And the other thing that I do not know is where else Butler ESU sent that information. I have not been briefed on that. Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Who told them to go look? Do you know if they were told to go look? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I do not know, sir. Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): We just know that they did go look. Col. Christopher L. Paris: Yes, sir. And like I said, a very concerted effort with all of those alcoves and all of those buildings was made. There were two additional officers who, again, I don't know the specifics of the timeline, I don't know the specifics of the logistics of how that information was relayed, but I'm briefed that they came and they made a very concerted effort to try and locate Crooks. 4:12:05 Col. Christopher L. Paris My understanding is the two officers that responded and one hoisted up, the second one were not part of Butler ESU. They were two separate municipal officers who were tasked with a different responsibility. I would speculate, as an example, to say a traffic post or… Rep. Mark Green (R-TN): Understood. Col. Christopher L. Paris: And they responded. I don't know, again, the specifics as to how they were alerted, but just to be clear, they were two separate. Yes, sir. 4:12:30 Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): The Butler ESU officers who spotted Crooks, do I understand correctly, they spotted him from the second floor of the AGR building? Col. Christopher L. Paris: That is my understanding. Yes, sir. Rep. Dan Bishop (R-NC): Okay. Were they posted there in order to maintain Overwatch on the roof, or were they generally assigned roving responsibility to be in the vicinity of that building? Col. Christopher L. Paris: I can't answer that, and I would defer to the Secret Service. July 22, 2024 House Committee on Oversight and Accountability Witnesses: Kimberly Cheatle, [then] Director, United States Secret Service Clips Time stamps correspond to YouTube version 19:45 Rep. James Comer (R-KY): A little over a week ago, Americans watched in horror as a shooter attempted to assassinate President Donald J. Trump at a campaign rally in Butler, Pennsylvania. The gunman nearly succeeded. The bullet that struck President Trump's head was less than an inch from taking his life. President Trump survived, but one rallygoer, Corey Comparatore, tragically did not. Two others were seriously injured. It was a horrifying moment in American history. The horror was exceeded only by the bravery of the law enforcement agents who threw themselves in harm's way when shots were fired, the bravery of a crowd unwavering in its refusal to panic, and the bravery of a bloody President Trump refusing to run. 32:55 Kimberly Cheatle: Today we are joined by Kimberly Cheatle, who was sworn into office on September 17, 2022, as the Director of the United States Secret Service. Prior to her appointment, Director Cheatle was Senior Director of Global Security at PepsiCo. Before her role at Pepsi, she served 27 years in the Secret Service. 35:40 Kimberly Cheatle: The Secret Service's solemn mission is to protect our nation's leaders. On July 13th, we failed. As the Director of the United States Secret Service, I take full responsibility for any security lapse of our agency. We are fully cooperating with ongoing investigations. We must learn what happened, and I will move heaven and Earth to ensure that an incident like July 13th does not happen again. Let me state unequivocally, nothing I have said should be interpreted to place blame for this failure on our federal, state, or local law enforcement partners who supported the Secret Service in Butler. We could not do our job without them. 37:05 Kimberly Cheatle: I will be transparent as possible when I speak with you. Understanding, though, at times, that I may be limited in providing a thorough response in this open setting due to associated risks with sharing highly sensitive protective methodologies. 38:30 Kimberly Cheatle: The comprehensive advance process involves collaborative planning between our Secret service, the protectee's staff, and local law enforcement partners. The level of security provided for the former President increased well before the campaign and has been steadily increasing as threats evolve. The security plan included a full assessment of the Butler Farm Show grounds to identify security vulnerabilities and craft a security plan for the protectee, attendees, and the public. Immediately following the assassination attempt, I directed the activation of my crisis center. I assembled my executive team to begin surging more protective resources to the former President and to ensure the wellness of our people post-incident, all while securing an active crime scene. I immediately ordered a reevaluation of the Republican National Convention Security Plan, and I increased the security posture in the National Capitol Region for all permanent protectees and sites. At the same time, I initiated a Mission assurance investigation within our agency. 41:40 Rep. James Comer (R-KY): Let's start with the building that the shooter used to shoot President Trump from. At any point Saturday, did the Secret Service have an agent on top of that roof? Kimberly Cheatle: Sir, as I'm sure you can imagine that we are just nine days out from this incident and there's still an ongoing investigation, and so I want to make sure that any information that we are providing to you is factual. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): You can't, okay. Can you answer why the Secret Service didn't place a single agent on the roof? Kimberly Cheatle: We are still looking into the advanced process and the decisions that were made. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): Okay, okay. Wasn't that building within the perimeter that should be secured? Do we agree with that? Kimberly Cheatle: The building was outside of the perimeter on the day of the visit, but again, that is one of the things that during the investigation, we want to take a look at and determine whether or not other decisions should have been made. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): One of the things that you said, I believe in an interview, that there wasn't an agent on the roof because it was a sloped roof. Is that normal? And do you fear that that immediately creates an opportunity for future would-be assassins to look for a slanted roof? I mean, this is a huge question that every American has. Why wasn't a Secret Service agent on the roof? And there have been reports that agents were supposed to be on the roof, but it was hot that day and they didn't want to be on the roof. Can you answer any of those questions, Director? Kimberly Cheatle: So I appreciate you asking me that question. Chairman. I should have been more clear in my answer. When I spoke about where we placed personnel in that interview, what I can tell you is that there was a plan in place to provide Overwatch, and we are still looking into responsibilities and who was going to provide Overwatch, but the Secret Service in general, not speaking specifically to this incident, when we are providing Overwatch, whether that be through counter snipers or other technology, prefer to have sterile rooftops. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): Did the Secret Service use any drones for surveillance that day? Kimberly Cheatle: So again, I'm not going to get into specifics of that day in itself, but there are times during a security plan that the Secret Service does deploy an asset like a drone. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): There were reports that the shooter used a drone just a few hours before the rally start time. Is that accurate? Kimberly Cheatle: I have heard those same reports. And again, am waiting for the final report. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): If you can't answer the question, that's your answer. But can you answer this? Do you know, I'm not asking yes or no, but do you know if the shooter used a drone before the shooting? Kimberly Cheatle: That information has been passed to us from the FBI. Rep. James Comer (R-KY): How many Secret Service agents were assigned to President Trump on the day of the rally? Kimberly Cheatle: Again, I'm not going to get into the specifics of the numbers of personnel that we had there, but we feel that there was a sufficient number of agents assigned. 46:05 Rep. James Comer (R-KY): Before July 13th, had the Trump detail requested additional resources? Kimberly Cheatle: What I can tell you is that for the event on July 13th, the assets that were requested for that day were given. 46:25 Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): It's been reported that before former President Trump got up on the stage at around 6:00 PM on Saturday, July 13th, that the local police had identified and even photographed a man who was acting suspiciously. And this man, who turned out to be the gunman, had been flagged as a potential threat. Is that accurate? Kimberly Cheatle: What I can say is that the individual was identified as suspicious. Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): So he was known to be suspicious before former President Trump took the stage. Kimberly Cheatle: That is the information I have received. Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): Why was he allowed to take the stage with a suspicious person having been identified in the crown? Kimberly Cheatle: So I appreciate the question, and I'd like to make two points. If the detail had been passed information that there was a threat, the detail would never have brought the former president out onto stage. That is what we do and that is who we are. We are charged with protecting all of our protectees. Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): So you distinguish between someone who is suspicious and someone who's threatening. Is that right? Kimberly Cheatle: We do. There are a number of times at protective events where suspicious people are identified and those individuals have to be investigated and determined what is it that identifies that person as suspicious? 47:45 Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): Did you deny a request for additional resources that had been made by the Trump campaign? Kimberly Cheatle: There were no assets denied for that event in Butler on the 13th. Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): I see. So you're saying there were requests made for additional assistance for other specific events, rather than for the campaign as a whole. Is that right? Kimberly Cheatle: I'm sorry, I'm not understanding. Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): You seem to say that there were not additional resources requested for that event. And forgive me for being unfamiliar with this. Is it requested event-by-event or is it requested just in general for the campaign? Kimberly Cheatle: So if I can explain the advance process. When an event or an venue is identified by, in this case, campaign staff, then the campaign staff works together with Secret Service agents who go out and conduct an advance. Generally that is a five day time period where those discussions are had about what the perimeter is going to look like, what the size of the event is, what the venue is, and then from there there is a request made to mitigate potential risk and threat. And I'm saying that on that day, the requests that were pushed forward were granted. 49:00 Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): So the Secret Service did not know that the gunman actually had a weapon before President Trump was allowed to get up on the stage. Kimberly Cheatle: To the best of our knowledge and the facts that we have at this point, that is correct. 49:50 Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): It's been reported that the shooter was not carrying a driver's license or any form of identification. They had no idea who he was, but then he was quickly identified, I think within 30 minutes, by using the serial number on the AR-15 under a tracing system that is now controversial. Some people say we should get rid of it, some people want to keep it. But is that right, that the serial number was the key information which led to the identification of the shooter? Kimberly Cheatle: That is my understanding, sir. Yes. 52:50 Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): How many times did you turn them down ahead of that? Kimberly Cheatle: I think that it is important to distinguish between what some people may view as a denial of an asset or a request -- Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Well, Mr. Guglielmi, your spokesperson, he said he acknowledged the Secret Service had turned down some requests. I'm asking how many. Kimberly Cheatle: A denial of a request does not equal a vulnerability. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Well, tell me what it is. Kimberly Cheatle: There are a number of ways that threats and risks can be mitigated with a number of different assets, whether that be through personnel, whether that be through technology or other resources. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Well tell the committee which it was. They asked for additional help in some form or another. You told them no. How many times did you tell them no? And what'd you tell them no to? Kimberly Cheatle: Again, I cannot speak to specific incidents, but I can tell you in general terms the Secret Service is judicious with their resources based on -- Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): What does some requests mean? How many times? Requests is plural. So more than once they ask for additional help and you turned them down. What did they ask for and how many times did you turn them down? Pretty basic questions. Kimberly Cheatle: So again, without having all of the details in front of me, sir, what I can tell you is that there are times when -- Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): You didn't get briefed on how many times you turned down the Trump detail when they asked for additional help? Kimberly Cheatle: I'm sorry. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-OH): Didn't get briefed on that before you came to this hearing, knowing you were going to get asked that question? Kimberly Cheatle: What I can tell you is that in generic terms, when details make a request, there are times that there are alternate ways to cover off on that threat. 1:04:05 Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH): Director Cheatle, have you read the intelligence of the generalized threat to Donald Trump by Iran as a result of their desire to retaliate for the killing of Soleimani? Kimberly Cheatle: I have. Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH): Have you read or been briefed about the intelligence of the specific recent threat to Donald Trump from Iran? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes, I have. Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH): Director Wray, when we were getting our briefing, indicated that he thought the threat assessment should have included this threat from Iran. Is it your testimony today that the threat assessment, since you've read this intelligence, was sufficient to protect him from this threat from Iran? Kimberly Cheatle: My testimony today is that the information that we had at the time was known, that -- Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH): Was it sufficient, Director Cheatle? Was it sufficient for the Iranian threat that you said you have read the intelligence briefings for? Kimberly Cheatle: That information was passed to -- Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH): Well, I'm not asking the bureaucratic issue of who did it get passed around to. Director Cheatle, was it sufficient for the specific and generalized threat to Donald Trump's life from Iran? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes, I do believe it was. Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH): Director Cheadle, is an Iranian assassin more capable than a 20-year-old? Kimberly Cheatle: Sir, I think we've acknowledged that there was gaps and a failure that day. 1:09:15 Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): There were some reports that the individual had a rangefinder. That would certainly raise my suspicion. Did he have a rangefinder? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes, he did. But may I explain that at a number of our sites, especially when you're at outdoor venues, a rangefinder is not a prohibited item. It is sometimes an item that is brought in by individuals if you're going to be in the back. Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): Did anybody confront him on that? Anybody ask him questions? What are you doing with the rangefinder? Anybody confront him on his presence where he was in proximity to the President? Kimberly Cheatle: So again, to my knowledge, I believe that that was the process that was taking place, was to locate the individual. Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): Did they confront him? Did they go up to him? Did they talk to him? Kimberly Cheatle: I do not have those details at this time. Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): Yeah, those are important details. 1:10:40 Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): There was considerable delay in removing the president from the podium after the shooting began. He got shot in the ear, and it was still over a minute before he was removed from the stage. Meanwhile, this shooter had multiple clips. Several clips. He got off eight shots, and he had the capacity and the ability, if he was not neutralized, to basically mow down that whole Secret Service detachment as well as the President. What, from your own investigation, caused that delay under the circumstances. Kimberly Cheatle: What I can tell you is that when the agents identified that the shooting was taking place, in under three seconds they threw themselves on top of the -- Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): I understand that. There was heroism there. No question about it. No question about it. But protocol would indicate, and these are the opinions of various former Secret Service agents, people who have done this work in the past, that over a minute of exposure on that podium, with a shooter with a high-capacity weapon, who had already wounded the President and could have got off we don't know how many more rounds, and yet the President remained exposed even though he was joined in that exposure by the Secret Service in their heroic acts. I dunno if there's a good explanation for that. Kimberly Cheatle: Our personnel created a body bunker on top of the President, shielding him. Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): I get that. Yeah. This was an AR 15 style weapon that would've made pretty quick work if he was determined and able to do so. 1:13:00 Kimberly Cheatle: As of today, the Secret Service has just over 8,000 employees. We continue to hire knowing that we need to ensure that we keep pace with a -- Rep. Stephen Lynch (D-MA): What would be the full compliment that you're looking for? You've got 8,000 and how many would be a full complement for the service? Kimberly Cheatle: So we are still striving towards a number of 9,500 employees, approximately, in order to be able to meet future and emerging needs. 1:25:15 Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): When this guy took the shots, he climbed a ladder to get on the roof, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: I'm unable to answer details of exactly how the individual accessed the roof at this time. Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): Do you know if he did use the ladder? Do you know when the ladder was placed there? Was the ladder there two days before? Just the night before? Do you have any information at all as to when the ladder got there? Kimberly Cheatle: I would like to be able to answer those questions. The FBI is still conducting an investigation. 1:25:20 Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): Were President Trump's normal agents, normally assigned to him, there that day? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes. Rep. Glenn Grothman (R-WI): These were the same agents that were always there? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes, sir. The people that are assigned to his detail were working on that day. 1:30:45 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): As you know, the shooter began shooting at 6:11 PM Eastern on July 13th. NBC reported that at 5:51 PM, 20 minutes before the shooting began, the State Police informed the Secret Service of their concern. Now, the rally was not paused at that point, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: No. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): And according to NBC, just two minutes later, at 5:53 PM, the Secret Service notified its snipers about the gunman. The rally wasn't paused at that point either, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: No. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Let me show you some video footage by rally goers. If you could play the video on the screen up here. This was taken two minutes before the shooting started. If you could turn up the volume. Rally goers: Right up here, he's on the roof. Right there, right on the roof. He's standing up now. Right on the roof. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Ma'am, that doesn't look like suspicious behavior. That looks like threatening behavior to me. And the rally wasn't paused at that point either, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: I can tell you, as I stated earlier, sir, that the moment that the shift surrounding the President were aware of an actual threat. -- Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): That's a threat, right there. The guy's on the roof and everybody's yelling at him and directing the officer's attention to him. The rally was not paused at that point, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: We are currently still combing through communications and when communications were passed. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Well, I can point you to this communication. It's two minutes before the shots started ringing out. Director Cheatle, yes or no, was there ever a moment where the Secret Service actually considered pausing the rally? Kimberly Cheatle: The Secret Service would've paused the rally had they known or -- Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): So the answer is no -- Kimberly Cheatle: -- been told there was an actual threat. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): The answer is no, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: I can speak to you in generalities. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): No, no. I don't want generalities. I want specifics. The answer is no, you did not consider pausing the rally, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: The people that are in charge of protecting the President on that day would never bring the former President out if there was a threat that had been identified. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Well, they did because we've now identified three points in the 20 minutes before the shooting that the threat emerged. Let me point you to something else, which is the building that the shooter was perched on, seen here. This building is called the AGR building. I'm sure that you're familiar with it. It's no more than 150 yards from the stage where Donald Trump stood. Yet the security perimeter was drawn such that the AGR building was placed outside of it. Director Cheatle, according to the Washington Post, the AR 15-style rifle used in the shooting had a range of 400 to 600 yards, and therefore the AGR building was clearly within rifle range of the stage, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): NBC News has reported that in the days before the rally, the Secret Service had identified the building as a vulnerability that required special attention, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: That's reporting from NBC? Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Yes. Kimberly Cheatle: So I am still looking into an active investigation. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): I know, but it's been nine days. I mean, you should know that, right? And yet, despite the fact that the AGR building was in rifle range of the stage, and it was flagged as a vulnerability, this building was put outside of the Secret Service's security perimeter. And I respectfully submit, the Secret Service must expand its security perimeter to account for the kinds of weapons that can be used outside the perimeter to endanger the protectees inside the perimeter. 1:34:50 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): First, you have not found evidence that the incident was a stage shooting, right? Kimberly Cheatle: Correct. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): And you haven't found evidence that this was a result of a conspiracy of high ranking government officials, correct? Kimberly Cheatle: Correct. Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): And you have not found evidence that this incident was in fact directed or perpetrated by a foreign state or entity, right? Kimberly Cheatle: Not at this time. 1:58:15 Rep. Pete Sessions (R-TX): Have any employees been disciplined for their role in the Butler, PA incident? Kimberly Cheatle: No, sir. Not at this time. I am asking those questions. 2:01:30 Rep. James Comer (R-KY): It's been nine days, every American wants these questions answered. Do you have a ballpark estimate of when what Mr. Sessions asked you would be able to answer, time wise? Kimberly Cheatle: I can tell you on our mission assurance internal investigation, we are targeting to have that completed within 60. 2:02:10 Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): Director Cheatle, respectfully, what you had just laid out about 60 days. We are currently in the midst of an especially concentrated presidential campaign in the moment that is also paired with, of course, elections happening across the country that are happening in about a hundred days. So the notion of a report coming out in 60 days when the threat environment is so high in the United States, irrespective of party, is not acceptable. 2:03:55 Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): Director Cheatle, is there a standard perimeter that the Secret Service establishes around an event, or are those perimeters independently determined per event and scenario? Kimberly Cheatle: There is no standard. Every event and every venue is different and treated as such. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): So each event has a different perimeter that is established depending on the logistics of that event. Now, you established earlier that the building upon which the shooter operated from was outside of that established perimeter, correct, for the Butler Pennsylvania event? Kimberly Cheatle: It was outside of our secure perimeter, yes. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): Now, that building was, I believe, 500....How far away was that building from the President? Kimberly Cheatle: It was approximately 200 yards. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): 200 yards. Now, the individual used an AR 15 in order to act out his assassination attempt, an AR 15 has a range of about 400 to 600 yards. My question is, why is the Secret Service Protective perimeter shorter than one of the most popular semi-automatic weapons in the United States? Kimberly Cheatle: There are a number of weapons out there with a number of ranges. Again, an advance was completed. The determination of the perimeter, I'm not going to speak to specifics, but there are a number of factors that are taken into account when we determine our perimeter. Some of it has to do with terrain, some of it has to do with buildings, some of it has to do with assets and resources that are available. Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): And so what I'm hearing is that a perimeter was not established outdoors in an outdoor venue that would prevent an AR 15, which is one of the most common weapons used in mass shootings, from being able to be within the range of Secret Service protection. Kimberly Cheatle: A perimeter was established, and even though there were buildings that were outside of that perimeter, it wasn't just that building. There were a number of buildings in the area and there was Overwatch that was created to help mitigate some of those buildings. 2:32:45 Rep. Melanie Stansbury (D-NM): I want to talk a little bit about the timeline. Now, here's what we know, and I know, Director, you were also on the call that we had a few days ago with the FBI and other law enforcement. So I respect that you are not able to share based on your testimony, some of the details that are currently being investigated, but I know you were on the call because I heard you on the call and you heard them too. So I'm going to lay out the timeline a little bit. On July 3rd, the rally was announced that it was going to be in Butler. On July 6th, three days later, we know that the shooter searched for dates for Trump and DNC events. On July 7th, so this is four days after the announcement, the shooter went to the site. He actually physically went to the site. On July 12th, the shooter went to a gun range where he and his dad regularly go and practiced shooting. And the next day, on July 13th, he went to the site again before the rally began. We know that he then went and searched online for a gun store, where he went and he purchased 50 rounds of ammunition, went home, got his father's AR, which was legally purchased, and returned to the venue at 5:00 PM that evening. This is more than an hour before Donald Trump actually took the stage that evening. Local law enforcement we're made aware that there was a suspicious man. In fact, at 5:20, local law enforcement flagged that he had a rangefinder and they radioed their concerns and sent around pictures of the individual. At 5:40, 20 minutes before local law enforcement actually identified the shooter and at 5:51 Secret Service was notified of the suspicious person by the state police. And one minute later, they distributed that information. That was before Donald Trump even took the stage. That was 11 minutes before he took the stage. So the Secret Service was aware that there was a suspicious person. At 6:03 he took the stage. At 6:09, rally goers, as was shown in the video, identified this gentleman climbing on the roof. At 6:11, three shots were heard, three rounds of shots, and of course the president and the other victims were shot. 2:48:35 Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): So given that there was an increased threat to President Trump's life, was he provided a full security compliment akin to what a sitting US President would receive? Kimberly Cheatle: He was provided a full compliment of security based on the threat assessment that we had and the venue. Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): That's not my question. My question is, if he'd been the sitting President, would he have had the same security he had on July 13th or would it have been beefed up? Kimberly Cheatle: There is a difference between the sitting President -- Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): So your answer is, he didn't. Kimberly Cheatle: -- and continuity of government and the responsibility that we had -- Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): So he did not, okay. There wasn't a full CAT team on site. There wasn't countersurveillance teams on site. 2:49:25 Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): Have you visited the site? Kimberly Cheatle: No, I have not. 2:50:30 Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): You said, do you remember, in an ABC interview you did, that you didn't have people on the roof of the AGR building because you were worried about safety because of the slope? Kimberly Cheatle: I recall that statement. Rep. Pat Fallon (R-TX): Okay. Does the Secret Service have written policy you can share with us about sloped roofs? Kimberly Cheatle: No. 2:54:00 Kimberly Cheatle: So again, I think we're talking about the distinction between suspicious behavior and a threat, and at the time that this individual was identified, they were displaying suspicious behavior. I'm still waiting for interviews from the FBI to determine what it was that identified that individual as suspicious and what those behaviors were. 2:55:05 Rep. Summer Lee (D-PA): When there are so many teams that are collaborating, who takes the lead, and how is that determined? Kimberly Cheatle: The Secret Service is responsible for the security of the site and the coordination. Rep. Summer Lee (D-PA): And that was the case on July 13th? Kimberly Cheatle: Correct. 3:06:25 Kimberly Cheatle: I acknowledge that we are unaware at this time how the individual was able to access the roof. 3:06:35 Rep. Dan Goldman (D-NY): Overwatch meaning from other counter-sniper or other higher points. Kimberly Cheatle: Correct. 3:06:50 Kimberly Cheatle: I don't have the timeline of how the individual accessed the roof, where they accessed the roof, or how long they were on the roof. 3:13:40 Rep. Scott Perry (R-PA): Was Crook's vehicle inside any of your perimeters? Kimberly Cheatle: No, it was not. Rep. Scott Perry (R-PA): It was not. Was there a device located on Mr. Crook's body to detonate the vehicle? Kimberly Cheatle: That is the information that I have. 3:26:05 Kimberly Cheatle: The allocation of resources is decided based on the availability of personnel and their location and where they are, but there were sufficient resources that were given to the former President's event that day. Rep. William Timmons (R-SC): What did you just say? Did you just say there were sufficient resources? President Trump got shot. 3:32:05 Rep. Tim Burchett (R-TN): Were agents or officers inside the building? If so, what floor were they on? Kimberly Cheatle: We had local police officers inside the building. 3:59:30 Rep. Lisa McClain (R-MI): Have you been in communication with the FBI? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes, I have. Rep. Lisa McClain (R-MI): With whom? Kimberly Cheatle: I speak with the Director and the Deputy Director. Rep. Lisa McClain (R-MI): Okay. And what have they shared with you about this investigation? So I'll give you an opportunity to answer again. Did they share with you how many shell casings were on the roof? Kimberly Cheatle: They have shared with me the -- Rep. Lisa McClain (R-MI): Did they share with you how many shell casing were on the roof? Kimberly Cheatle: Yes. Rep. Lisa McClain (R-MI): Okay. How many were there? Kimberly Cheatle: I would refer to the FBI for their investigation. 4:13:20 Kimberly

Ever wonder what it’s like to attend a Republican National Convention? How about an RNC that took place two days after their candidate was almost assassinated? In this bonus episode, Jen dishes on her experience at the RNC 2024 in Milwaukee Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Audio Sources July 18, 2024 C-SPAN Music by Editing Production Assistance

The Boeing 737 Max line of airplanes has been in the news often in the last 5 years after two fatal plane crashes and a door plug flew off a plane mid-flight, but Boeing’s recklessness extends far beyond the 737 Max. In this episode, hear testimony from whistleblowers, engineering experts, and government regulators during recent Congressional investigations into Boeing’s prioritization of its stock price over our safety. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes Boeing’s Ongoing Problems Mike Bedigan. July 10, 2024. The Independent. July 10, 2024. Federal Aviation Administration. Noa Halff. July 9, 2024. The Daily Mail. March 8, 2024. NBC Bay Area. Tom Vacar and Zak Sos. March 7, 2024. KTVU FOX 2. NASA Starliner AP. June 29, 2024. NPR. Kenneth Chang. June 5, 2024. The New York Times. Kenneth Chang. March 6, 2020. The New York Times. Ties to US Government Defense Edward Carver. May 29, 2024. Truthout. Yeganeh Torbati and Aaron Gregg. November 25, 2020. The Washington Post. Lobbying OpenSecrets. OpenSecrets. Alaska Airlines Door Plug Blowout Simon Scarr et al. January 11, 2024. Reuters. FAA “Oversight” Marc Warren and Paul Alp. February 1, 2024. Adams and Reese LLP. Deferred Prosecution Agreement January 7, 2021. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division. Boeing Guilty Plea David Koenig and Alanna Durkin Richer. July 9, 2024. AP News. Joel Rose. July 9, 2024. NPR. David Dayen. July 3, 2024. The American Prospect. Stock Buybacks Stock Buybacks History. Boeing Orders Boeing. John Barnett Mike Bedigan. June 18, 2024. The Independent. Theo Leggett. March 11, 2024. BBC News. May 4, 2021. United States Department of Labor Administrative Law Judges. Staying Safe on Planes Peter Weber. January 8, 2015. The Week. Harold Maass. January 8, 2015. The Week. Charles W. Bryant. Nd. Mapquest Travel. McDonnell Douglas Merger James Surowiecki. January 15, 2024. The Atlantic. Natasha Frost. January 3, 2020. Quartz. Laws Audio Sources June 18, 2024 Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Witnesses: David Calhoun, President and Chief Executive Officer, The Boeing Company June 13, 2024 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation Witnesses: , Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration April 17, 2024 Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Witnesses: Sam Salehpour, Current Quality Engineer, Boeing Ed Pierson, Executive Director, The Foundation for Aviation Safety, Former Boeing Manager Joe Jacobsen, Aerospace Engineer and Technical Advisor to the Foundation for Aviation Safety, Former FAA Engineer Dr. Shawn Pruchnicki, Professional Practice Assistant Professor of Integrated Systems Engineering, The Ohio State University April 17, 2024 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation Witnesses: Dr. Javier de Luis, Lecturer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics Dr. Tracy Dillinger, Manager for Safety Culture and Human Factors, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Dr. Najmedin Meshkati, Professor, University of Southern California, Aviation Safety and Security Program March 6, 2024 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation Witnesses: Jennifer Homendy, Chair of the National Transportation Safety Board Bloomberg Originals March 12, 2020 June 4, 2019 Music by Editing Production Assistance

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The Supreme Court issued a handful of decisions this week that will change the way the United States government functions. In this episode, learn about the likely consequences of cases that pose challenges to government regulations and analyze the effect that immunity for former Presidents is going to have on the criminal cases pending against former President Donald Trump and all future Presidents…or Kings. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes Supreme Court Decisions Mark Sherman. July 1, 2024. AP News. Matt Stoller. July 1, 2024. BIG on Substack. Audio Sources July 2, 2024 The White House Music by Editing Production Assistance

Every American who has a mortgage is required by their bank to have homeowners insurance, but getting it and keeping it is becoming a challenge. In this episode, hear the highlights of a Senate hearing examining the problems in the homeowners insurance market and why they might lead to much bigger problems next time disaster strikes. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Effects of Climate on Insurance Christopher Flavelle and Mira Rojanasakul. May 13, 2024. The New York Times. Chris Van Hollen et al. September 7, 2023. Chris Van Hollen, U.S. Senator for Maryland. Alice C. Hill. August 17, 2023. Council on Foreign Relations. Insurance Information Institute. Antonio Grimaldi et al. November 19, 2020. McKinsey & Company. Lobbying OpenSecrets. OpenSecrets. OpenSecrets. Heritage Foundation SourceWatch. Demotech William Rabb. April 15, 2024. Insurance Journal. Parinitha Sastry et al. December 2023. Fannie Mae Adam Hayes. May 17, 2023. Investopedia. Hurricanes National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Audio Sources Senate Committee on the Budget June 5, 2024 Witnesses: Glen Mulready, Insurance Commissioner, State of Oklahoma Rade Musulin, Principal, Finity Consulting Dr. Ishita Sen, Assistant Professor of Finance, Harvard Business School Deborah Wood, Florida Resident , Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation’s Grover Hermann Center for the Federal Budget Clips 23:05 Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI): In 2022 and 2023, more than a dozen insurance companies left the Florida residential market, including national insurers like Farmers. Residents fled to Citizens Property Insurance, the state backed insurer of last resort, which ballooned from a 4% market share in 2019 to as much as 17% last year. If it has to pay out claims that exceed its reserves, citizens can levy a surcharge on Florida insurance policy holders across the state. Good luck with that. Particularly if the surcharge grows to hundreds or even thousands of dollars to depopulate its books. Citizens has let private insurers cherry pick out its least risk policies. Those private insurers may have problems of their own, as we will hear today. 25:10 Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI): The federal budget takes a hit because these insurers and their policies are accepted by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, who either own or guarantee a large part of our $12 trillion mortgage market. This all sounds eerily reminiscent of the run-up to the mortgage meltdown of 2008, including a role of potentially captive or not fully responsible rating agencies. 25:45 Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI): Florida is far from alone. A New York Times investigation found that the insurance industry lost money on homeowners coverage in 18 states last year, and the states may surprise you. The list includes Illinois, Michigan, Utah, Washington, and Iowa. Insurers in Iowa lost money each of the last four years. This is a signal that hurricanes and earthquakes, once the most prevalent perils, are being rivaled by hail, windstorms, and wildfires. 28:00 Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI): This isn't all that complicated. Climate risk makes things uninsurable. No insurance makes things unmortgageable. No mortgages crashes the property markets. Crashed property markets trash the economy. It all begins with climate risk, and a major party pretending that climate risk isn't real imperils our federal budget and millions of Americans all across the country. 33:45 Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA): Insurance premiums are far too high across the board and may increase after the recent storms, including those very storms in my state of Iowa. Climate change isn't the primary driver of insurance rate hikes and collapse of the insurance industry isn't imminent. Although I'll have to say, Iowa had six property and casualty companies pull out of insuring Iowans. Climate change doesn't explain why auto insurance premiums in 2024 have increased by a whopping 20% year over year. It also doesn't account for the consistent failure of liberal cities to fight crime, which has raised insurance risk and even caused insurers to deny coverage. Expensive liberal policies, not climate change, are much to blame for these market dynamics. 39:00 Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI): The first witness is Rade Musulin. Rade is an actuary with 45 years of experience in insurance, specializing in property pricing, natural perils, reinsurance, agriculture, catastrophe, risk modeling, public policy development, and climate risk. Specifically, he spent many years working in Florida, including as chair of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund Advisory Council during the time in which Citizens Property Insurance Corporation was established. 39:35 Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI): Our second witness is Dr. Ishida Sen. Dr. Sen is an Assistant Professor at Harvard Business School. Her recent research examines the pricing of property insurance and the interactions between insurance and mortgage markets. This includes the role that institutions and the regulatory landscape play and the broader consequences for real estate markets, climate adaptation, and our overall financial stability. 40:00 Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI): Our third witness is Deb Wood. Ms. Wood and her husband Dan McGrath are both retired Floridians. They moved to South Florida in 1979 and lived in Broward County, which includes Fort Lauderdale for 43 years until skyrocketing insurance premiums became too much. They now reside in Tallahassee, Florida. 40:35 Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA): Dr. EJ Antoni is a Research Fellow at the Heritage Foundation Grover M. Hermann Center for the Federal Budget. His research focuses on fiscal and monetary policy, and he previously was an economist at the Texas Public Policy Foundation. Antoni earned his Master's degree and Doctor's degree in Economics from Northern Illinois University. 41:10 Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-IA): Commissioner Glen Mulready has served as Oklahoma's 13th Insurance Commissioner and was first elected to this position in 2019. Commissioner Mulready started his insurance career as a broker in 1984, and also served in the Oklahoma State House of Representatives. 42:15 Rade Musulin: Okay. My name is Ray Muslin. I'm an actuary who has extensive experience in natural hazard risks and funding arrangements for the damage and loss they cause. I've worked with many public sector entities on policy responses to the challenges of affordability, availability of insurance, and community resilience. This work included participating in Florida's response to Hurricane Andrew, which included the creation of the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund and Citizens Property Insurance Corporation. The Cat Fund and Citizens can access different forms of funding than traditional insurance companies. Instead of holding sufficient capital or reinsurance before an event to cover the cost of potential losses, both entities use public sources of capital to reduce upfront costs by partially funding losses post-event through bonding and assessments. All property casualty insurance policy holders, whether in Citizens or not, are subject to its assessments. While the Cat Fund can also assess almost all policies, including automobile, this approach exposes Floridians to debt and repayment if large losses occur, and it subsidizes high risk policies from the entire population. These pools, others like them in other states, and the NFIP have contributed to rapid development in high risk areas driving higher costs in the long run. In Florida, national insurers have reduced their exposure as a significant proportion of the insurance market has moved to Citizens or smaller insurers with limited capital that are heavily dependent on external reinsurance. To date, Florida's system has been successful in meeting its claims obligations, while improvements in building codes have reduced loss exposure. However, for a variety of reasons, including exposure to hurricanes, claims cost inflation, and litigation, Florida's insurance premiums are the highest in the nation, causing significant affordability stress for consumers. According to market research from Bankrate, the average premium for a $300,000 home in Florida is three times the national average, with some areas five times the national average. A major hurricane hitting a densely populated area like Miami could trigger large and long lasting post-event assessments or even exceed the system's funding capacity. Continued rapid exposure growth and more extreme hurricane losses amplified by climate change will cause increasing stress on the nation's insurance system, which may be felt through solvency issues, non-renewals, growth of government pools, and affordability pressure. 44:55 Rade Musulin: Evidence of increasing risk abounds, including Hurricane Otis in 2023, which rapidly intensified from a tropical storm to a cat. five hurricane and devastated Acapulco in Mexico last summer. Water temperatures off Florida exceeded a hundred degrees Fahrenheit last week. As was alluded to earlier, NOAA forecast an extremely active hurricane season for '24. We've seen losses in the Mid-Atlantic from Sandy, record flooding from Harvey, and extreme devastation from Maria, among others. In coming decades, we must prepare for the possibility of more extreme hurricanes and coastal flooding from Texas to New England. 46:50 Dr. Ishita Sen: Good morning Senators. I am Ishita Sen, Assistant Professor at Harvard Business School and my research studies insurance markets. In recent work with co-authors at Columbia University and the Federal Reserve Board, I examine how climate risk creates fiscal and potentially financial instability because of miscalibrated insurer screening standards and repercussions to mortgage markets. 47:15 Dr. Ishita Sen: Insurance is critical to the housing market. Property insurers help households rebuild after disasters by preserving collateral values and reducing the likelihood that a borrower defaults. Insurance directly reduces the risks for mortgage lenders and the Government-Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Mortgage Lenders therefore require property insurance and the GSEs only purchase mortgages backed by insurers who meet minimum financial strength ratings, which measure insurer solvency and ability to pay claims. The GSEs accept three main rating agencies AM Best, S & P and, more recently, Demotech. And to provide an example, Fannie Mae requires insurers to have at least a B rating from AM Best, or at least an A rating from Demo Tech to accept a mortgage. Now, despite having this policy in place, we find a dramatic rise in mortgages backed by fragile insurers and show that the GSEs and therefore the taxpayers ultimately shoulder a large part of the financial burden. Our research focuses on Florida because of availability of granular insurance market data, and we show that traditional insurers are exiting and the gap is rapidly being filled by insurers, rated by Demotech, which has about 60% market share in Florida today. These insurers are low quality across a range of different financial and operational metrics, and are at a very high risk of becoming insolvent. But despite their risk, these insurers secure high enough ratings to meet the minimum rating requirements set by the GSEs. Our analysis shows that many actually would not be eligible under the methodologies of other rating agencies, implying that in many cases these ratings are inflated and that the GSEs insurer requirements are miscalibrated. 49:20 Dr. Ishita Sen: We next look at how fragile insurers create mortgage market risks. So in the aftermath of Hurricane Irma, homeowners with a policy from one of the insolvent Demotech insurers were significantly more likely to default on their mortgage relative to similar borrowers with policies from stable insurers. This is because insurers that are in financial trouble typically are slower to pay claims or may not pay the full amounts. But this implies severe economic hardships for many, many Floridians despite having expensive insurance coverage in place. However, the pain doesn't just stop there. The financial costs of fragile insurers go well beyond the borders of Florida because lenders often sell mortgages, for example, to the GSEs, and therefore, the risks created by fragile insurers spread from one state to the rest of the financial system through the actions of lenders and rating agencies. In fact, we show two reasons why the GSEs bear a large share of insurance fragility risk. First is that lenders strategically securitize mortgages, offloading loans backed by Demotech insurers to the GSEs in order to limit their counterparty risk exposures. And second, that lenders do not consider insurer risk during mortgage origination for loans that they can sell to the GSEs, even though they do so for loans that they end up retaining, indicating lax insurer screening standards for loans that can be offloaded to the GSEs. 50:55 Dr. Ishita Sen: Before I end, I want to leave you with two numbers. Over 90%. That's our estimate of Demotech's market share among loans that are sold to the GSEs. And 25 times more. That's Demotech's insolvency rate relative to AM Best, among the GSE eligible insurers. 57:15 Glen Mulready: As natural disasters continue to rise, understanding the dynamics of insurance pricing is crucial for both homeowners and policymakers. Homeowners insurance is a fundamental safeguard for what is for many Americans their single largest asset. This important coverage protects against financial loss due to damage or destruction of a home and its contents. However, recent years have seen a notable increase in insurance premiums. One significant driver of this rise is convective storms and other severe weather events. Convective storms, which include phenomena like thunderstorms, tornadoes, and hail, have caused substantial damage in various regions. The cost to repair homes and replace belongings after such events has skyrocketed leading insurance companies to adjust their premiums to cover that increased risk. Beyond convective storms, we've witnessed hurricanes, wildfires, and flooding. These events have not only caused damage, but have also increased the long-term risk profile of many areas. Insurance companies are tasked with managing that risk and have responded by raising premiums to ensure they can cover those potential claims. 58:30 Glen Mulready: Another major factor influencing homeowner's insurance premiums is inflation. Inflation affects the cost of building materials, labor, and other expenses related to home repair and reconstruction. As the cost of living increases, so does the cost of claims for insurers. When the price of lumber, steel, and other essential materials goes up, the expense of repairing or rebuilding homes also rises. Insurance companies must reflect these higher costs in their premiums to maintain financial stability and ensure they can meet those contractual obligations to policyholders. 59:35 Glen Mulready: I believe the most essential aspect of managing insurance premiums is fostering a robust, competitive free market. Competition among insurance companies encourages innovation and efficiency, leading to better pricing and services for consumers. When insurers can properly underwrite and price for risk, they create a more balanced and fair market. This involves using advanced data analytics and modeling techniques to accurately assess the risk levels of different properties. By doing so, insurance companies can offer premiums that reflect the true risk, avoiding excessive charges for low risk homeowners, and ensuring high risk properties are adequately covered. Regulation also plays a crucial role in maintaining a healthy insurance market. Policyholders must strike a balance between consumer protection and allowing insurers the freedom and flexibility to adjust their pricing based on the risk. Overly stringent regulations can stifle competition and lead to market exits, reducing choices for consumers. We've seen this play out most recently in another state where there were artificial caps put in place on premium increases that worked well for consumers in the short term, but then one by one, all of the major insurers began announcing they would cease to write any new homeowners insurance in that state. These are all private companies, and if there's not the freedom and flexibility to price their products properly, they may have to take drastic steps as we've seen. Conversely, a well-regulated market encourages transparency and fairness, ensuring that homeowners have access to the most affordable and adequate coverage options. 1:02:00 Dr. EJ Antoni: I'm a public finance economist and the Richard F. Aster fellow at the Heritage Foundation, where I research fiscal and monetary policy with a particular focus on the Federal Reserve. I am also a senior fellow at the Committee to Unleash Prosperity. 1:02:15 Dr. EJ Antoni: Since January 2021, prices have risen a cumulative 19.3% on average in the American economy. Construction prices for single family homes have risen much faster, up 30.5% during the same time. 1:03:20 Dr. EJ Antoni: Actuarial tables used in underwriting to estimate risk and future losses, as well as calculate premiums, rely heavily on those input costs. When prices increase radically, precisely as has happened over the last several years, old actuarial tables are of significantly less use when pricing premiums because they will grossly understate the future cost to the insurer. The sharp increase in total claim costs since 2019 has resulted in billions of dollars of losses for both insurers and reinsurers prompting large premium increases to stop those losses. This has put significant financial stress on consumers who are already struggling with a cost of living crisis and are now faced with much higher insurance premiums, especially for homeowners insurance. 1:05:10 Dr. EJ Antoni: The increase in claims related to weather events has undoubtedly increased, but it is not due to the climate changing. This is why the insurance and reinsurance markets do not rely heavily on climate modeling when pricing premiums. Furthermore, climate models are inherently subjective, not merely in how the models are constructed, but also by way of the inputs that the modeler uses. In other words, because insufficient data exists to create a predictive model, a human being must make wide ranging assumptions and add those to the model in place of real world data. Thus, those models have no predictive value for insurers. 1:07:40 Sen. Sheldon Whitehoue (D-RI): You say that this combination of demographics, development, and disasters poses a significant risk to our financial system. What do you mean by risk to our financial system Rade Musulin: Well, Senator, if you look at the combination, as has been pointed out, of high growth and wealth accumulation in coastal areas, and you look at just what we've observed in the climate, much less what's predicted in the future, there is significant exposure along the coastline from Maine to Texas. In fact, my family's from New Jersey and there is enormous development on the coast of New Jersey. And if we start to get major hurricanes coming through those areas, the building codes are probably not up to the same standards they are in Florida. And we could be seeing some significant losses, as I believe was pointed out in the recent Federal Reserve study. Sen. Sheldon Whitehoue (D-RI): And how does that create risk to the financial system? Rade Musulin: Well, because it's sort of a set of dominoes, you start with potentially claims issues with the insurers being stressed and not able to pay claims. You have post-event rate increases as we've seen in Florida, you could have situations where people cannot secure insurance because they can't afford it, then that affects their mortgage security and so on and so forth. So there are a number of ways that this could affect the financial system, sir. Sen. Sheldon Whitehoue (D-RI): Cascading beyond the immediate insurer and becoming a national problem. Rade Musulin: Well, I would just note Senator, that in Florida, the real problems started years after we got past Andrew. We got past paying the claims on Andrew, and then the big problems occurred later when we tried to renew the policies. 1:10:50 Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI): And you see in this, and I'm quoting you here, parallels in the 2008 financial crisis. What parallels do you see? Dr. Ishita Sen: So just like what happened during the financial crisis, there were rating agencies that gave out high ratings to pools of mortgages backed by subprime loans. Here we have a situation where rating agencies like Demotech are giving out inflated ratings to insurance companies. The end result is sort of the same. There is just too much risk and too many risky mortgages being originated, in this case backed by really low quality insurers that are then entering the financial system. And the consequences of that has to be born by, of course the homeowners, but also the mortgage owners, GSCs (Government Sponsored Enterprises), the lenders, and ultimately the federal and state governments. Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI): You say, this will be my last question. The fragility of property insurers is an important channel through which climate risk might threaten the stability of mortgage markets and possibly the financial system. What do you mean when you refer to a risk to the financial system? Dr. Ishita Sen: Well, as I was explaining the GSEs, if there are large losses that the GSEs face, then those losses have to be plugged by somebody. So the taxpayers, that's one channel through which you've got risk to the financial system and the GSE's serve as a backstop in the mortgage market. They may not have the ability or capacity to do so in such a scenario, which affects mortgage backed security prices, which are held by all sorts of financial institutions. So that starts affecting all of these institutions. On the other hand, if you've got a bunch of insurers failing, another channel is these insurers are one of the largest investors in many asset classes like corporate bonds, equities, and so on. And they may have to dump these securities at inopportune times, and that affects the prices of these securities as well. 1:12:45 Sen. Chuck Grassley (R-AI): Dr. Antoni, is there any evidence to support the notion that climate change is the greatest threat to the insurance market? Dr. EJ Antoni: No. Senator, there is not. And part of that has to do again, with the fact that when we look at the models that are used to predict climate change, we simply don't have enough empirical data with which we can input into those models. And so as a result of that, we have to have human assumptions on what we think is going to happen based essentially on a guess. And as a result of that, these models really are not of any predictive value, and that's why these models for the last 50 years have been predicting catastrophic outcomes, none of which have come true. 1:14:45 Glen Mulready: This focus on the rating agencies, I would agree with that if that were the be all end all. But the state insurance commissioners in each 50 states is tasked with the financial solvency of the insurance companies. We do not depend on rating agencies for that. We are doing financial exams on them. We are doing financial analysis every quarter on each one of them. So I would agree if that was the sort of be all end all, forgive that phrase, but it's not at all. And we don't depend very much at all on those rating agencies from our standpoint. 1:22:15 Dr. Ishita Sen: On the point about regulators looking at -- rating agencies is not something that we need to look at. I would just point out that in Florida, if you look at the number of exams that the Demotech rated insurers, that by the way have a 20% insolvency rate relative to 0% for traditional insurers, they get examined at the same rate as the traditional insurers like Farmers and AllState get examined, which is not something that you would expect if you're more risky. You would expect regulators to come look at them much, much more frequently. And the risk-based capital requirements that we have currently, which were designed in the 1980s, they're just not sensitive enough to new risks like wildfire and hurricanes and so on. And also not as well designed for under-diversified insurance companies because if so, all of these insurers were meeting the risk-based capital requirements, however, at the same time going insolvent at the rate of 20%. So those two things don't really go hand in hand. 1:23:25 Dr. Ishita Sen: Ultimately what the solution is is something that is obviously the main question that we are here to answer, but I would say that it is extremely hard to really figure out what the solution is, in part because we are not in a position right now to even answer some basic facts about how big the problem is, what exactly the numbers look like. For instance, we do not know basic facts about how much coverage people have in different places, how much they're paying. And when I say we don't know, we don't know this at a granular enough level because the data does not exist. And the first step towards designing any policy would be for us to know exactly how bad the problem is. And then we come up with a solution for that and start to evaluate these different policy responses. Right now we are trying to make policy blindfolded. 1:23:50 Sen. Ron Johnson (R-WI): So we've had testimony before this committee that we've already spent $5-6 trillion. That's 5,000 to 6,000 billion dollars trying to mitigate climate change. We haven't made a dent in it. Their estimates, it's going to cost tens of trillions of dollars every year to reach net zero. So again, this is not the solution for a real problem, which is the broken insurance market. I have enough Wisconsin residents who live on the Gulf Coast in Florida to know after Hurricane Ian, you got some real problems in Florida. But fixing climate change isn't the solution. 1:33:15 Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-OR): In looking at the materials I saw that Citizens Property Insurance Company, I gather that's Louisiana and Florida, that have a completely state backed program. Well, alright, so if the state becomes the insurer of last resort and they now suffer the same losses that a regular private insurance company is suffering, now the folks in the state are carrying massive debt. So that doesn't seem like a great solution. Dr. Ishita Sen: That's definitely a problem, right? The problem is of course, that whether the state then has the fiscal capacity to actually withstand a big loss, like a big hurricane season, which is a concern that was raised about Citizens. And in such a scenario then in a world where they do not have enough tax revenue, then they would have to go into financial markets, try to borrow money, which could be very costly and so on. So fiscally it's going to be very challenging for many cities and many municipalities and counties and so on. 1:36:40 Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT): I wish there were something we could do that would reduce the climate change we're seeing and the warming of the planet. But I've seen absolutely nothing proposed by anyone that reduces CO2 emissions, methane gases and the heating of the planet. Climate change is going to happen because of the development in China and Indonesia and Brazil, and the only thing that actually makes any measurable impact at all is putting a price on carbon, and no one seems to be willing to consider doing that. Everything else that's being talked about on the climate — Democratic Senator: I got two bills. Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT): I know you and I are, but you guys had reconciliation. You could have done it all by yourselves and you didn't. So the idea that somehow we're going to fix climate and solve the insurance problem is pie in the sky. That's avoiding the reality that we can't fix climate because that's a global issue, not an American issue. Anyway, let me turn back to insurance. 1:38:30 Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT): So the question is, what actions can we take? Fiscal reform? Yes, to try and deal with inflation. Except I want to note something, Mr. Antoni, because you're esteemed at the Heritage Foundation. 72% of federal spending is not part of the budget we vote on. So we talk about Biden wants to spend all this.... 72% we don't vote on; we only vote on 28%. Half of that is the military. We Republicans want more military spending, not less. So that means the other 14%, which the Democrats want to expand, there's no way we can reduce the 14% enough to have any impact on the massive deficits we're seeing. So there's going to have to be a broader analysis of what we have to do to reign in our fiscal challenges. I just want to underscore that. I would say a second thing we can do, besides fiscal reform and dealing with inflation, is stopping subsidizing high risk areas. Basically subsidizing people to build expensive places along the coast and in places that are at risk of wildfire. And we subsidize that and that creates huge financial risk to the system. And finally, mitigation of one kind or another. That's the other thing we can do is all sorts of mitigation: forestry management, having people move in places that are not high risk. But if you want to live in a big house on the coast, you're gonna have to spend a lot of money to insure it or take huge risk. That's just the reality. So those are the three I come up with. Stop the subsidy, mitigation, and fiscal reform. What else am I missing, Mr. Musulin? And I'm just going to go down the line for those that are sort of in this area to give me your perspectives. Rade Musulin: Well, thank you, Senator. And I'd agree with all those things. And I'd also add that we need to start thinking about future-proofing our building codes and land use policies. The sea levels are rising. If you're going to build a house that's supposed to last 75 years, you ought to be thinking about the climate in 75 years when you give somebody a permit to build there. So I'd say that's important. I'd also say that large disasters also drive inflation because it puts more pressure and demand on labor and materials. More disasters means supplies that could have been used to build new homes for Americans or diverted to rebuild homes in the past. So certainly doing things to reduce the vulnerability of properties and improve their resilience is important. And I do think, sir, that there are things we can do about climate change with respect over periods of decades that can make a difference in the long run. Thank you. Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT): Thank you. Yes. Dr. Ishita Sen: So before that, the one point about inflation that we are missing, which is without doubt it is a contributing factor, but the US has had inflation in the past without such an acute crisis in insurance markets. So whether that is the biggest cause or not is up for debate. I don't think we have reached a conclusion on inflation being the biggest contributor of rising insurance cost. Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT): It's just a big one. You'd agree It's a big one? Dr. Ishita Sen: I agree. It's a big one, but I wouldn't say it's the biggest one in terms of policy solutions. I completely agree with you on, we need to stop subsidizing building in high risk areas. That's definitely one of the things we need to do that. Mitigation, another point that you bring up. And on that, I would say not only do we need to harden our homes, but we also need to harden our financial institutions, our banks, and our insurance companies in order to make them withstand really large climate shocks that are for sure coming their way. Sen. Mitt Romney (R-UT): Thank You, Ms. Wood. I'm going to let you pass on this just because that's not your area of expertise. Your experience was something which focused our thinking today. Mr. Mulready. Glen Mulready: Thank you, Senator. I would say amen to your comments, but I'll give you three quick things. Number one, FEMA has a survey out that states that every $1 spent in mitigation saves $6 in lost claims. It pays off. Number two, unfortunately, a lot of communities have to have a disaster happen. In Moore, Oklahoma, back a dozen years ago, an EF5 (tornado) hit, it was just totally devastating. After that, the city of Moore changed their zoning, they changed their building zoning codes, and then third, the city of Tulsa, back in the eighties, had horrible flooding happened. So they invested over decades in infrastructure to prevent flooding. Now we're one of only two communities in the country that are Class one NFIP rated. 1:45:40 Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD): One way to address this, and I think it was discussed in a different matter, is the need to get the data and to get consensus on where the risks lie, which is why last year Senator Whitehouse, Senator Warren and I sent a letter to the Treasury Department, to the Federal Insurance Office (FIO), urging them to collect information from different states. I'm a supporter of a state-based insurance system for property and casualty insurance, but I do think it would benefit all of us to have a sort of national yardstick against which we can measure what's happening. So Dr. Sen, could you talk a little bit about the benefit of having a common source of insurance data through the FIO and how that could benefit state regulators and benefit all of us? Dr. Ishita Sen: Yeah, absolutely. Thanks for bringing that up. That's just the first order importance, I think, because we don't even know the basic facts about this problem at a granular enough level. The risks here are local, and so we need to know what's going zip code-by-zip code, census tract-by-census tract, and for regulators to be able to figure out exactly how much risk is sitting with each of these insurance companies they need to know how much policies they're writing, what's the type of coverage they're selling in, what are the cancellations looking like in different zip codes. Only then can they figure out exactly how exposed these different insurers are, and then they can start designing policy about whether the risk-based capital ratios look alright or not, or should we put a surcharge on wildfires or hurricanes and so on? And we do need a comprehensive picture. We just can't have a particular state regulator look at the risks in that state, because of course, the insurer is selling insurance all over the country and we need to get a comprehensive picture of all of that. 1:47:40 Sen. Chris Van Hollen: I appreciate that. I gather that the Treasury Department is getting some resistance from some state insurance regulators. I hope we can overcome that because I'm not sure why anyone would want to deny the American people the benefit of the facts here. 1:48:45 Rade Musulin: I will just note that sometimes climate change itself can contribute to the inflation we've been talking about. For example, there were beetle infestations and droughts and fires in Canada, which decimated some of the lumber crop and led to a fivefold increase in the cost of lumber a few years ago. So some of this claims inflation is actually related to climate change, and I think we need to address that. 1:49:35 Glen Mulready: If you didn't know, the NAIC, National Association of Insurance Commission is in the midst of a data collection right now that will collect that data for at least 80% of the homeowner's market. And we have an agreement with FIO (Federal Insurance Office) to be sharing that data with them. They originally came to us, I got a letter from FIO and they were requesting data that we did not actually collect at the zip code level, and they had a very stringent timeline for that. So my response, it wasn't, no, it was just, look, we can't meet that timeline. We don't collect that today. We can in the future. But from that is where this has grown the data called by the NEIC. Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-MD): So I appreciate, I saw that there had been now this effort on behalf of the....So has this now been worked out? Are there any states that are objecting, to your knowledge at this point in time, in terms of sharing data? Glen Mulready: I don't know about specific states. We will be collecting data that will represent at least 80% of the market share. Music by Editing Production Assistance

In March, the Senate received testimony from the Chair of the National Transportation Safety Board about some transportation related dangers that you should know about. In this episode, hear testimony about those dangers, including those posed by airborne tourism companies, electric vehicles, and self driving technology. You will also hear a stunning NTSB finding about a likely profit-prioritization decision of railroad company Norfolk Southern, which unnecessarily lead to the poisoning of East Palestine, OH. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes Traffic Fatalities National Center for Statistics and Analysis. April 2024. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Helicopter Crashes May 10, 2022. National Transportation Safety Board. n.d. National Transportation Safety Board. Audio Sources March 6, 2024 Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transportation Witnesses: Jennifer Homendy, Chair, National Transportation Safety Board Clips Sen. Eric Schmitt (R-MO): I did have some questions. I know that Senator Fisher mentioned some of this earlier as relates to electric vehicles. The weight of some of these vehicles, including, I know you mentioned the battery alone can be the weight of a Honda Civic or a Toyota Corolla, and so there's certainly safety issues there. It relates to guardrails and other vehicles on the road. You would agree with that, right? Jennifer Homendy: Yes. Sen. Eric Schmitt (R-MO): There's also issues, I wanna talk about our infrastructure too. The weight of these vehicles, the strain that it can have on parking garages, roads, and bridges. The amount of money that will be expended to either reinforce or repair. Who is looking at this? Because we have a mandate for auto manufacturers to produce 50% of their fleet to be electric vehicles by 2030. I know there's a new rule in the works to have that number increased. I don't know if it's 65% or 75% by 2032, that's being considered. So it seems to me we're entering this phase as it relates to these mandates for electric vehicles and all of these repercussions, all of these ancillary concerns, I don't know who's addressing it, so I'm asking you, are you guys looking at this? Who is looking at this? Because this seems to be a disaster on the horizon for the American people and our infrastructure, but I don't hear a lot of talk about it. Jennifer Homendy: Thank you, Senator. I have raised this consistently over the past year and a half, starting with a transportation research board where I raised concerns with respect to increasing size and weight of all vehicles, but particularly the weight of electric vehicles that we really needed to look at the safety impact, not just on crashes, but to our infrastructure as well, and protecting people. The whole reason why we have a guardrail is to protect people when there is a crash. Yet it wouldn't withstand some of the crashes with some of these high weights of heavy vehicles, including heavy electric vehicles as was demonstrated by the University of Nebraska. Somebody needs to take action here. We have repeatedly flagged it. It is within the Department of Transportation's purview to do that, and I encourage them strongly to get ahead of it. We're behind right now. Sen. Eric Schmitt (R-MO): As it relates to first responders who are responding to crashes that lithium batteries are involved with, what is your take on the safety for our first responders as they're responding to these EV crashes? Jennifer Homendy: It's a significant danger. We issued a report just a few years ago raising concerns regarding a number of crashes that we investigated involving electric vehicles and the risk to emergency responders from stranded energy inside the battery and components and the significant potential for shock. We also raised concerns with respect to secondary responders, which are the tow truck operators because we saw many of these vehicles reigniting on the tow truck and up to five days later in the tow yard. Sen. JD Vance (R-OH): February 3rd, 2023 derailment of the train. Is it true that Norfolk Southern's contractors monitored temperatures on one of the chemical tank cars from the afternoon of February 5th into the afternoon of February 6th, which is when the controlled burn happened, and communicated their initial readings to Oxy Vinyls, the shippers in charge of the vinyl chloride cars? Jennifer Homendy: That's accurate, Senator. Sen. JD Vance (R-OH): Is it true that these readings indicated an initial temperature of 135 degrees Fahrenheit at 4:00 PM on February 5th, which eventually declined to 126 degrees Fahrenheit at 9:30 AM on February 6th, at which point it stabilized? Jennifer Homendy: That's correct, Senator. It was stabilized well before the vent and burn. Many hours before. Sen. JD Vance (R-OH): So declining temperatures, you would think, and stabilized temperatures are consistent, not with something that needs to be exploded, but with something that can be dealt with in a slightly less, less catastrophic way. At least that's my read on it. But is it true that the chemical shipper Oxy Vinyls concluded that the reported and stabilized tank car temperatures were too low for a runaway chemical reaction, meaning the sort of thing that would lead to an uncontrolled explosion? Jennifer Homendy: That's correct. They had testified that polymerization was not occurring. In order for polymerization to occur, which was Norfolk Southern and their contractor's justification for the vent and burn. You would have to have rapidly increasing temperatures and some sort of infusion of oxygen, neither of which occurred. Sen. JD Vance (R-OH): Right. And just to be clear, you would need both of those things. It's not an either/or. You need both of them to precipitate polymerization, which would lead to an uncontrolled... Jennifer Homendy: Correct. Sen. JD Vance (R-OH): So is it true that Norfolk Southern's contractors testified to the NTSB that they were not certain a chemical reaction was occurring in the derailed vinyl chloride tank car? Jennifer Homendy: They testified to that, yes sir. Sen. JD Vance (R-OH): Is it correct that the chemical shippers testified that there was no free radical agent or sufficient heat trajectory to justify Norfolk Southern Contractor's assessment that a chemical reaction was occurring? Jennifer Homendy: That's correct. Sen. JD Vance (R-OH): So from this assessment, is it your understanding that Norfolk Southern's contractors lacked scientific basis to support their conclusion that polymerization was occurring in the derailed VCM tank cars? Jennifer Homendy: Yes, in fact, they were informed by Oxy vinyls of the information that should have been taken by the contractors in their decision making. But yes, they did not have that. They lacked the scientific background to address that.Sen. JD Vance (R-OH): So let me just go to one final question here. We combine all these facts together. Your reporting thus far concludes that Norfolk Southern's contractors recommendation to conduct a controlled burn lacked sufficient scientific basis, disregarded available temperature data and contradicted expert feedback from the shipping firm on site. Now, this was all told to the decision makers on the ground, they had to make a decision in less than 13 minutes to blow up all five of these toxic chemical cars without any other voices being included to offer a contrary opinion. Is that right? Jennifer Homendy: That's correct. Sen. JD Vance (R-OH): So again, I appreciate your work on this, but just to sort of summarize, this is an extraordinary finding. We were told effectively that there were two bad options. The uncontrolled burn -- excuse me, the controlled burn or the uncontrolled explosion. And it seems based on the data that we have that there was not a ton of reason to do the controlled burn. And that of course is what spread toxic chemicals all over this community and the surrounding region. It's really an extraordinary finding. It goes to highlight the importance of your work. But I also have to note that residents on the ground talk about the fact that immediately after the controlled burn, they moved the tank cars and train traffic was moving through their town and moving through their community. I won't ask you to speak to motivations here, but when you have an unnecessary controlled burn that poisoned a lot of people, that then led to rapid transit of train traffic, a lot of people, including me, are wondering, did they do this not because it was necessary, but because it allowed them to move traffic and freight more quickly. And if so, that is an extraordinary thing that I think requires a lot of further work from this committee and from others. But we will stop there. Because I see my time is up. Thank you. Chair Homendy. Jennifer Homendy: May I add something to that? Senator, I would say the factual information in our docket shows that Oxy Vinyls was on scene and providing information to Norfolk Southern and their contractors on the fourth, fifth, and sixth. They informed them that they believed polymerization was not occurring and there was no justification to do a vent and burn. Rightfully, Norfolk Southern's contractors ruled out hot tapping and transloading 'cause it would've been a potential safety issue for their employees. But there was another option. Let it cool down. It was cooling down. We know for a fact that when that pressure relief device went off, that it had to have been above 185 degrees. Later, over the course of 22 hours, that tank car was cooling, not to mention the other four tank cars that were only between 64 and 69 degrees. So Oxy Vinyls was on scene providing information to Norfolk Southern's contractor who was in the room when the decision was made and when advice was given to the governor of Ohio, to the incident commander. They were not given full information because no one was told Oxy Vinyl was on scene. They were left out of the room. The incident commander didn't even know they existed. Neither did the governor. So they were provided incomplete information to make a decision. Sen. Tammy Baldwin (D-WI): I'm wondering if you could provide a status update on how you view the current safety standards for helicopter air tours. And do you believe that the safety provisions included in the Senate version of the FAA bill would improve the safety of these tours? Jennifer Homendy: Thank you very much for your work on this issue and for Senator Schatz's work on this issue. I think it's critical. The NTSB believes in one level of safety. As before I became NTSB chair or before I worked on the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, if I showed up with my family to take an air tour, I would not know to ask what are the qualifications of the crew? What are your operating standards? What are your operating rules? What are your maintenance procedures? You wouldn't normally ask those questions. If you are somebody who shows up for a parachute jump flight, you think my biggest risk is jumping out of the plane, not getting on the plane, which also crashed in Hawaii. So we believe you're a paying passenger, whether you're on part 1 21, part 1 35, part 91, you deserve the same level of safety. And we have advocated strongly for a set of regulatory standards that address just that. We've seen no action on that. This is something I have been extremely passionate about since I came to the board, whether it was flyNYON in New York, where we literally listened to some people's last moments that were strapped into a helicopter on an air tour with a Home Depot harness that was supposed to hold them in and they couldn't unhook it, they drowned. That is horrific. So still we don't have the standards we've recommended. We did an entire report on ensuring safety in revenue passenger operations under part 91. We looked at incidents or accidents, terrible tragedies in Hawaii, Arizona, I mentioned New York, Connecticut with a B 17, historic adventure flight that crashed. And each time we continue to say safety needs to improve and each time we've been ignored. The public deserves better. FAA should issue standards to ensure their safety. Jennifer Homendy: So the derailment rate is sort of a combined rate from mainline track and for the yards. We are seeing a significant increase in derailments and tragedies in the yards. That is where we're very concerned about employee safety. We've seen that repeatedly. We've issued a number of recommendations. We have a lot of open investigations. For Norfolk Southern alone we have eight investigations that are currently open, and we're also doing a safety culture review separate from East Palestine. But in particular we have 190 safety recommendations that we've issued that are currently open to improve rail safety. Whether it's preventing fatigue or providing for increased inspection or new technologies to supplement, not supplant workers, supplement the work to ensure safety. Those 190 have not been acted upon. Happy to provide those for the hearing record, but they can be today and I hope they will. Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA): Now I'd like to turn to the significant risk posed by autonomous vehicles. In the past eight years, the NTSB has investigated multiple incidents involving autonomous driving technologies like Tesla's autopilot system that are designed to operate in specific road conditions, particularly on highways. In fact, in 2016, NTSB recommended that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and auto manufacturers restrict drivers from activating these systems outside those road conditions. It's long past time that we take firm control of the wheel and steer towards safety and implement this recommendation. So, Madam Chair, can you briefly explain the reasoning for this recommendation? Jennifer Homendy: Yes. And in fact, I thought this may come up because this is a, you're a champion on this issue, and I just pulled Tesla's statement on, which is really their limitations on operational design domain. They warn on their website for those who have vehicles, that some of their automation will not work in some areas, including areas of poor visibility, heavy rain, snow, fog, bright light, oncoming headlights, direct sunlight, mud, ice, snow, interference or obstruction by objects mounted onto the vehicle, narrow, high-curvature, or winding roads and damaged or misaligned bumper, an extremely hot or cold temperature, an area where the vehicle is not designed to operate using that technology. Who reads that? We have to make -- Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA): Well, that just leaves backing out of the driveway and then going back into your car again. Because other than that, you're out on the road. This isn't like the postal service through rain, sleet, snow, gloom of night. They're saying, well, the sunlight might affect it or the snow might affect it, or rainy conditions might affect it. Or winding roads might affect it. So as I'm listening to that description, it sounds like to me it's not ready for prime time. It's not ready to be handed over to people who have grown up with a car that they drive, where they expect the brakes or the steering wheel to all work, no matter where they're going, and not, oh, by the way, this thing that you just turned on could be extremely dangerous for your two kids in the backseat. Jennifer Homendy: Well, and if it's only designed to be operated in a certain type of environment, it should be limited to those environments. We issued that recommendation to Tesla following the 2016 tragedy in Williston, Florida. We issued the same recommendation to NHTSA. We issued it again. Both have failed to act on those recommendations. Music by Editing Production Assistance

President Biden has signed three new laws containing policy changes that will have long lasting effects on the people of Palestine. In this episode, seven months into the ongoing destruction of Gaza, see what Congress and the President have enacted in your name. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Recommended Sources for Gaza News Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes Who Pays for Corporate Media 2024. iSpot.tv. 2024. iSpot.tv. Hamas Dan De Luce et al. April 18, 2024. NBC News. December 29, 2023. International Court of Justice. Abdelali Ragad et al. November 27, 2023. BBC. Destruction of Khan Yunis Bisan Owda. May 21, 2024. AJ+ (@ajplus) and Al Jazeera English (@aljazeeraenglish) on Instagram. Israel’s Buffer Zone Around Gaza Ruwaida Kamal Amer. May 21, 2024. +972 Magazine. Camille Bressange et al. March 16, 2024. The Wall Street Journal. February 2, 2024. Jon Gambrell. AP News. Dov Liber et al. January 25, 2024. The Wall Street Journal. Loveday Morris et al. January 24, 2024. The Washington Post. Israeli Settlements March 20, 2024. CNN on YouTube. Amira Hass. March 12, 2024. Haaretz. Julia Frankel. February 23, 2024. AP News. Nir Hasson and Rachel Fink. January 28, 2024. Haaretz. Itai Weiss. December 27, 2023. Haaretz. Hagar Shezaf. December 11, 2020. Haaretz. Updated February 2, 2024. Encyclopedia Britannica. AI Kill List Isaac Chotiner. April 12, 2024. The New Yorker. April 5, 2024. Amy Goodman and Yuval Abraham. Democracy Now! Avi Scharf. April 5, 2024. Haaretz. Ishaan Tharoor. April 5, 2024. The Washington Post. April 3, 2024. The Guardian. Yuval Abraham. April 3, 2024. +972 Magazine. Yuval Abraham. November 30, 2023. +972 Magazine. Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman. Updated Oct. 18, 2023. The New York Times. Ami Rokhax Domba. February 14, 2023. Israel Defense. Tamir Eshel. June 13, 2021. Defense Update. Israelis Who Died in October October 19, 2023. Haaretz. Massacre at al-Shifa Hospital Tareq S. Hajjaj. April 11, 2024. Mondoweiss. Abeer Salman et al. April 1, 2024. CNN. Supplemental Funding April 24, 2024. The Washington Post. April 21, 2024. PBS NewsHour. UNRWA Ayesha Rascoe and Jackie Northam. April 28, 2024. NPR. Emanuel Fabian. February 16, 2024. The Times of Israel. Who Governs Palestine Noa Rone. March 8, 2024. Unpacked. UN Human Rights Council Updated April 5, 2024. United Nations Human Rights Council. April 18, 2023. United Nations General Assembly. ‘Detainee’ treatment February 19, 2024. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. United Nations Information Service. July 10, 2023. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Suppression of Journalism March 20, 2023. Jewish News Syndicate. January 24, 2002. BBC. Why It’s Not a War Ajit Singh (@ajitxsingh). November 14, 2023. X. Francesca Albanese. November 14, 2023. National Press Club of Australia on Youtube. Torture in Israeli Detention Facilities May 11, 2024. Middle East Eye on YouTube. CNN's International Investigations and Visuals teams. May 11, 2024. CNN. Netta Ahituv. May 4, 2024. Haaretz. Leahy Amendment Ben Samuels. April 27, 2024. Haaretz. International Criminal Court Michel Martin and John Bellinger III on All Things Considered. April 16, 2022. NPR. Laws Audio Sources May 5, 2024 Al Jazeera English on Instagram (@aljazeeraenglish) Imran Khan: If you are watching this prerecorded report, then Al Jazeera has been banned in the territory of Israel. On April the first, the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, passed a law that allowed the Prime Minister to ban Al Jazeera. He's now enacted that law. Let me just take you through some of the definitions. Within the law, they've banned our website, including anything that has the option of entering or accessing the website, even passwords that are needed whether they're paid or not, and whether it's stored on Israeli servers or outside of Israel. The website is now inaccessible. They're also banning any device used for providing content. That includes my mobile phone. If I use that to do any kind of news gathering, then the Israelis can simply confiscate it. Our internet access provider, the guy that simply hosts aljazeera.net, is also in danger of being fined if they host the website. The Al Jazeera TV channel [is] completely banned. Transmission by any kind of content provider is also banned and holding offices or operating them in the territory of Israel by the channel. Also, once again, any devices used to provide content for the channel can be taken away by the Israelis. It's a wide ranging ban. We don't know how long it'll be in place for, but it does cover this territory of the state of Israel. May 5, 2024 Al Jazeera English on YouTube Cyril Vanier: So what does the war look like, as presented by Israeli media to Israelis? Gideon Levy: Very, very simple picture. We are the victims. We are the only victims, as usual. There was the 7th of October, and we will stick to the 7th of October, which was almost the Holocaust in the eyes of most of the Israelis and this 7th of October enables us and legitimizes us to do whatever we want in Gaza. Gaza doesn't interest us. Gaza is Hamas and Hamas, Gaza. And therefore, we should punish them all, and if possible, even kill them al, destroy them all, and we will. We have no interest to see what's the suffer[ing] of Gaza, what's the punishment of Gaza, what the innocent people of Gaza are going through. We are only interested in the brave soldiers, the hostages and the victims of the 7th of October. That's our world, and that's the world that the Israeli media as a whole is describing to its viewers for seven months now, seven days a week, 24 hours a day. Only this, you don't see Gaza. April 10, 2024 House Foreign Affairs Committee Witnesses: Samantha Power, Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development Clips 47:15 Samantha Power: Again, you had very little, almost no child malnutrition before October 7, and you now have a massive spike. And particularly in the north, one in three kids are suffering from malnutrition. And again, the reports of famine also spreading to the south. It makes sense because so little assistance has gotten in commensurate to the needs of more than 2 million people. 1:13:55 Samantha Power: My understanding - this is something that Secretary Blinken is managing and you'll have a chance I'm sure to engage him on - but the national security memorandum 20 that was issued not long ago is taking 620 I and those elements into consideration. I think that report is due out in early May. 1:41:40 Samantha Power: You know well, because you've been in so many of these countries, we don't have an NGO out there -- This is not your traditional UN agency, where you can have like schools in a box, teachers in a box, health workers in a box. Hamas was the state and Hamas won the election back in the day. And Hamas had far too much influence on certain individuals, or even certain individuals were, it seems, potentially part of Hamas. But the fact is, the administration of schools and health systems was UNRWA. There's not an NGO or another UN agency that could perform the function of a State like that, or at least I haven't encountered one in my years of humanitarian service. 2:02:20 Samantha Power: One little parenthetical is, Israel, about a month ago, in light of the horrific allegations, made a decision that UNRWA could not participate in convoys to the north - humanitarian convoys. But what that meant was, fundamentally there could be no convoys to the north because you can't, as bombs are falling and kinetic operations are underway and terrorists are being pursued, suddenly invent an entire humanitarian infrastructure. 2:17:20 Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX): I want to ask you obviously about the very urgent situation humanitarian situation in Gaza. In your testimony, you said that the entire population of Gaza is living under the threat of famine. News reports came out recently that certain USAID officials sent a cable to the National Security Council warning that famine is already likely occurring in parts of the Gaza Strip. According to the report "famine conditions are most severe and widespread in northern Gaza, which is under Israeli control." Do you think that it's plausible or likely that parts of Gaza and particularly northern Gaza, are already experiencing famine? Samantha Power: Well, the methodology that the IPC used is one that we had our experts scrub, it's one that's relied upon in other settings, and that is their assessments and we believe that assessment is credible. Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX): So there's a famine is already occurring there. Samantha Power: That is… Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX): Yes, okay. 2:18:14 Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX): More than half of the population of Gaza is under the age of 18, as you know, and are seriously affected by the lack of access to food and nutrition. Various organizations, including the United Nations, have warned that hundreds of thousands of Palestinian children may die if they don't get necessary food and nutrition assistance in just the next two to three weeks. Has USAID made such an assessment itself? And do you have a sense of how many such children might be at risk of dying if they don't get access to food and nutrition that's currently unavailable? Samantha Power: I do not have those assessments on hand. But I will say that in northern Gaza, the rate of malnutrition, prior to October 7, was almost zero. And it is now one in three, one in three kids. But extrapolating out is hard. And I will say just with some humility, because it is so hard to move around in Gaza, because the access challenges that give rise in part to the malnutrition are so severe, it is also hard to do the kind of scaled assessments that we would wish to do. But in terms of actual severe acute malnutrition for under fives, that rate was 16% in January, and became 30% in February, and we're awaiting the the March numbers, but we expect it to -- Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX): So it got markedly worse. Samantha Power: Markedly worse. But extrapolating and giving you the overall numbers… Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX): And just to be clear, I realize you're not part of the DoD or the State Department even, working on these issues diplomatically. But is it your understanding that humanitarian assistance and food assistance is not supposed to be denied even when countries are at war with each other? Because there is this argument that if Hamas would release the hostages, if they would surrender, that this would stop, but there's certain laws of war and certain conduct that nations are supposed to follow, and that includes allowing for humanitarian assistance. Samantha Power: Correct. I mean, I will say, of course, we all agree the hostages should be released, absolutely. An absolute outrage that they had been kept this long and the horror and terror for their families, the families of those individuals I can't even contemplate but yes, food must flow. Rep. Joaquin Castro (D-TX): Kids can't be starved because you have two groups that are at war with each other. Samantha Power: Food must flow and food has not flowed in sufficient quantities to avoid this imminent famine in the south and these conditions that are giving rise already to child deaths in the north. 2:29:20 Samantha Power: Again, trusted partners like World Food Programme and UNICEF and others have not reported that Hamas is getting in the way of distributing humanitarian assistance. And I will say, nor are we getting those reports from the IDF who are present on the ground in Gaza. Rep. Kathy Manning (D-NC): I have been getting reports, in fact, that Hamas is targeting, punishing or hindering Palestinians who are working with the international community to provide humanitarian assistance. You have not seen any evidence of that? Samantha Power: I would be very interested in those reports, but that is not what our partners are reporting back to us. Rep. Kathy Manning (D-NC): Do you believe that Hamas is benefiting from the aid that we are providing to Gaza? Samantha Power: I mean, I don't even know how to think about that question in this moment when Hamas is on the run and being pursued across Gaza. So, you know, I don't think they are in a position, because of what the IDF is doing, to benefit per se. Would family members of Hamas potentially begin getting access at a food distribution? You know, that's possible. It's going to civilians. Rep. Kathy Manning (D-NC): Do you have any idea how Hamas fighters are getting their food? Samantha Power: I don't. Rep. Kathy Manning (D-NC): So it is a difficult balance to strike when we desperately want to make sure that innocent Palestinians don't suffer and don't starve, but we don't want to do anything to embolden Hamas. 2:46:10 Rep. Michael Lawler (R-NY): There was already serious concern with the operations of UNRWA prior to the administration's decision to cut funding. Further this past November, I led floor debate to pass the Peace and Tolerance in Palestinian Education Act, which discussed the anti-Jewish and anti-Israel curricula taught to children in Gaza and the West Bank, a curriculum taught by UNRWA employees. So while yes, we appreciate the prohibition on new funding in January, this is long overdue, as there were clear and present issues that UNRWA that look like were ignored by the administration. 2:48:45 Samantha Power: Putting people who want to eliminate another people in power is not anything that anybody would have wished. But the effect is that the governing institution had significant leverage over the UN agency that was carrying out -- Rep. Michael Lawler (R-NY): A terrorist state that has had control over this agency, which is in part why we have pushed to defund it. Would you support future year Appropriations defunding UNRWA? Samantha Power: I don't know if you've had a chance to talk to the King of Jordan, for example. Rep. Michael Lawler (R-NY): I've had dinner with him, in Jordan. Samantha Power: And about what it is going to mean for the Jordanian people to have 2 million young people basically looking for where their schools are going to get support. Now, it may be that the Europeans and others come in and address this issue and it doesn't -- Rep. Michael Lawler (R-NY): Defunding UNWRA does not mean that we don't deal with humanitarian issues. It doesn't mean that we don't -- Samantha Power: No, no but it just is the school system. Rep. Michael Lawler (R-NY): It doesn't mean that we don't deal with it, it means we find a different vehicle by which to do this, but UNRWA itself has proven to be corrupt. Samantha Power: You've been here for much of the exchange. There's no NGO, there's no UN agency that creates school systems. There's no, like, U haul where there's a school system that you just deploy in Jordan, to educate 2.6 million Jordanian kids, it just doesn't work that way. Rep. Michael Lawler (R-NY): Respectfully, being snide about it is not actually solving the issue here. The reality is UNRWA is not the vehicle by which we should be sending American taxpayer dollars at this point. It's just not. Samantha Power: We will follow the law. Rep. Michael Lawler (R-NY): Right, my question to you was, do you support moving forward? Samantha Power: I'm describing the benefits of educating young people across the region and providing health services, and I'm not seeing a viable alternative. So I would suggest -- Rep. Michael Lawler (R-NY): So you believe we should continue? Samantha Power: I think, first of all, we don't know what Gaza is going to look like after this war ends. Hopefully, Hamas will be dismantled and new institutions will be in place whereby they will take care of educating their own young people, and you won't need a UN agency to do it. But it is extremely important that we look out for young people in Gaza, it is going to do nobody any favors for them not to have access to an education Rep. Michael Lawler (R-NY): No, the fact is, on October 7, part of the reason that you had that type of terrorist attack is because of the level of hatred and anti-semitism that is taught in schools in Gaza. That is part of the problem here. And UNRWA helped in terms of allowing for that to occur under the guise of a UN agency. It is disgusting. It is shameful, and the fact that we as the United States have helped support that organization helped fund it is an embarrassment. And that's why we fought to defund it. 3:00:00 Rep. Madeleine Dean (D-PA): I am hypercritical of the alleged 12 or 15, who may have been infiltrating as Hamas, who may have participated in the October 7, horrendous barbaric attack. But you don't throw everybody and all the good work out. Because I want to ask you, if we continue this pause, if the world said we will not help you UNRWA, your however many thousands of workers who are on the ground, who keep coming to work even when their whole families are killed, what will happen with famine in Gaza, if we just shut it down? No more UNRWA. By the way, they're not educating. We know that they can't even do that now. They have incredibly important vaccines and medical aid to to be a part of, but the essentialness of food and water. What happens if we continue this disinformation campaign of 'Defund UNRWA'? Samantha Power: Well, first, thank you for bringing some facts into the conversation that I probably should have raised before, including just the horrific loss of life for those who work for UNRWA. And in general, you know, more than 228 workers killed by IDF or in my IDF military operations to this point, including, most recently of course, the World Central Kitchen colleagues, devastatingly. And thank you also for reminding us all. UNRWA is an organization in Gaza alone of 13,000 people. The vast majority of those people have not been propagating hate but have been actually trying to educate young people. The literacy rate in Gaza-West Bank, I think, is something like 99%. It's one of the most effective literacy efforts in any of the places that USAID works. In terms of what would happen if the whole thing shut down....Right now, it looks like other countries are stepping up to avert that scenario. But, you know, I just cannot overstate how chaotic and how horrific the conditions in Gaza are. You've spoken to them. The visuals speak to the level of destruction. There's no work-around for the infrastructure that they provide. After the war, when there's a new administration of Gaza, if that comes about, obviously, that's itself extremely complicated. You know, the question of who is providing education as they try to rebuild virtually everything from scratch and the education and the health sector? You know, some of these questions will be will be addressed. But right now, there is no way to avert large scale famine without relying on the humanitarian backbone that has been enriched for decades, and that remains UNRWA today. We are going to follow the law, we are going to work through other partners. But, I started to say this earlier: even the government of Israel, which had banned UNRWA's participation in convoys, because of the food crisis - and US engagement, I hope - has now decided that UNRWA can in fact be part of convoys going to the North because they recognize there's just no other way. Rep. Madeleine Dean (D-PA): Right. And I want to commend to anybody to please meet with the director of UNRWA who is stationed in Rafah: a 20-plus-year US military veteran. I don't know how people stay at this kind of work with the risks that they are taking, but they are there. Music by Editing Production Assistance

“FISA 702” allows the government to spy on foreigners and store the information that they collect about American citizens incidentally. After more than a decade of FBI officials inappropriately searching the database of our information without warrants, Congress just reauthorized the program and made some changes - some reigning the program in and some expanding it. In this episode, learn what those changes are and how they are likely to affect you. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes FISA Jasper Ward. April 20, 2024. Reuters. Luke Goldstein. April 12, 2024. The American Prospect. December 2019. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. Edward C. Liu. April 13, 2016. Congressional Research Service. History of Surveillance Mark Klein. November 8, 2007. C-SPAN Washington Journal. James Risen and Eric Lichtblau. December 16, 2005. The New York Times. NSA Spy Center Kashmir Hill. March 4, 2013. Forbes. James Bamford. March 15, 2012. Wired. PRISM program T.C. Sottek and Janus Kopfstein. July 17, 2013. The Verge. Laws Vote Breakdowns Audio Sources April 19, 2024 April 12, 2024 Speakers: November 8, 2007 C-SPAN Washington Journal Music by Editing Production Assistance

After an unprecedented embassy bombing followed by an unprecedented drone and missile attack, Israel and Iran may have us on the brink of WWIII. In this episode, as Congress and the Biden administration ponder additional support for Israel, we take a look at what has already been approved for Israel in the 2024 defense authorization and funding law. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes Netanyahu Howard Eissenstat. Sept 20, 2012. Slate. Akiva Eldar. February 10, 2009. Haaretz. Attacks on U.S. Bases Ken Klippenstein. February 9, 2024. The Intercept. Doug G. Ware. November 6, 2023. Stars and Stripes. Doug G. Ware. October 31, 2023. Stars and Stripes. Iran-Israel Conflict David Hearst. April 15, 2024. Middle East Eye. Tom Spender. April 15, 2024. BBC. Ken Klippenstein and Daniel Boguslaw. April 14, 2024. The Intercept. Barak Ravid. April 14, 2024. Axios. Ben Samuels. April 14, 2024. Haaretz. Cassandra Vinograd and Natan Odenheimer. April 14, 2024. The New York Times. Permanent Mission of I.R.Iran to UN, NY (@Iran_UN). April 13, 2024. Ellen Knickmeyer and Lolita C. Baldor. April 3, 2024. PBS NewsHour. Fear of U.S. War with Iran Ali Vaez. April 15, 2024. Foreign Affairs. Murtaza Hussain. April 14, 2024. The Intercept. Carol E. Lee et al. April 14, 2024. NBC News. Uri Misgav. November 23, 2023. Haaretz. Julian Borger. December 17, 2023. The Guardian. Marwan Bishara. October 9, 2023. Aljazeera. Defense funding for Israel Yuval Azulay. April 15, 2024.” CTech by Calcalist. Noah Robertson. November 15, 2023. Defense News. Jeremy M. Sharp. March 1, 2023. Congressional Research Service via EveryCRSReport.com. Raytheon. 2021. Rafael. Jeremy M. Sharp. September 30, 2014. Congressional Research Service via EveryCRSReport.com. Tony Capaccio. May 27, 2014. Bloomberg. January 7, 2014. Boeing. Boeing and Raytheon Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Open Secrets. Open Secrets. Open Secrets. Open Secrets. Foreign Military Financing Nathan J. Lucas and Michael J. Vassalotti. February 21, 2020. Congressional Research Service via EveryCRSReport.com. March 2017. Defense Security Cooperation Agency, U.S. Department of Defense.* Abraham Accords U.S. Department of State. Jordan Zvi Bar’el. April 15, 2024. Haaretz. Jonathan Shamir. April 16, 2023. Haaretz. Saudi Arabia April 14, 2024. Al Arabiya English. Laws Executive Producer Recommended Sources King Abdullah. 1947. From the Internet Archive, originally published in The American Magazine. Music by Editing Production Assistance

A bill is quickly moving through Congress that supposedly would “ban TikTok.” While it is clearly aimed at TikTok, this bill is really about creating a new Presidential power to remove Americans’ access to apps, websites, games and other entire tech platforms. In this episode, using the text of the bill itself, we examine how exactly this new censorship power would work if the bill passes the Senate and becomes law. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes The Not a TikTok Ban Bill Drew Harwell et al. March 13, 2024. The Washington Post. David E. Sanger. March 13, 2024. The New York Times. Aamer Madhani. March 8, 2024. AP News. Opposition to the bill Jenna Leventoff. March 13, 2024. ACLU. Access Now et al. March 12, 2024. ACLU. How we got here Dan Primack. March 12, 2024. Axios. Samantha Delouya and Brian Fung. November 30, 2023. CNN. Emily Baker-White. August 21, 2023. Forbes. November 20, 2023. Reuters. Brian Fung. December 30, 2022. CNN. James K. Jackson. February 14, 2020. Congressional Research Service. Grindr Echo Wang. May 13, 2019. Reuters. Jeff Farrah. April 15, 2019. TechCrunch. ByteDance Lily Kuo and Annabelle Timsit. March 13, 2024. The Washington Post. April 16, 2023. TikTok. Censorship and Spying Jonathan Vanian. January 22, 2024. CNBC. May 16, 2023. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Public Affairs. Marielle Descalsota. December 27, 2022. Business Insider. Lily Hay Newman. May 7, 2019. Wired. Israel and AIPAC Camille Bressange. March 16, 2024. The Wall Street Journal. Kate Linthicum. March 13, 2024. The Los Angeles Times. Celine Alkhaldi et al. March 8, 2024. CNN. December 3, 2023. Velshi on MSNBC. Rep. Mike Gallagher. November 1, 2023. The Free Press. Mater Dei High School. TikTok September 20, 2021. BBC. The Bill Audio Sources House Floor March 13, 2024 Clips 19:00 Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY): There was there were some people who were legitimately concerned that this was an overly broad bill and they got an exclusion written into the bill that I want to read. It says the term "covered company" does not include an entity that operates a website or application, whose primary purpose is to allow users to post product reviews, business reviews, or travel information and reviews. Why is this exception in the bill? Why did somebody feel like they needed this exception if the bill itself only covers social media applications that foreign adversaries are running now? 21:15 Rep. Frank Pallone (D-NJ): While this bill establishes a national security framework that could apply to other applications, much of the public attention is focused on TikTok. 23:15 Rep. Michael Gallagher (R-WI): Mr. Speaker, TikTok is a threat to our national security because it is owned by ByteDance, which does the bidding of the Chinese Communist Party. We know this because ByteDance’s leadership says so and because Chinese law requires it. This bill, therefore, would force TikTok to break up with the Chinese Communist Party. It does not apply to American companies. It only applies to companies subject to the controlof foreign adversaries defined by Congress. It says nothing about election interference and cannot be turned against any American social media platform. It does not impact websites in general. The only impacted sites are those associated with foreign adversary apps, such as TikTok.com. It can never be used to penalize individuals. The text explicitly prohibits that. It cannot be used to censor speech. It takes no position at all on the content of speech, only foreign adversary control of what is becoming the dominant news platform for Americans under 30. 25:55 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): This divestment requirement is not new. It's not without precedent. When the app Grindr, a popular LGBTQ app, was acquired by a Chinese company, and the United States government determined that sensitive data of LGBTQ members of the military and US government officials got into the hands of the Chinese Communist Party, they required divestment. This happened quickly. Why? Because Grindr was a very valuable social media company. The same is true with regard to TikTok, and there will be no disruption to users, just as there was with Grindr. 27:25 Rep. Raja Krishnamoorthi (D-IL): Last week, under the leadership of the Chairwoman and the Ranking Member, they brought up for consideration our bill before the House Energy and Commerce Committee. On the morning of that vote, TikTok, delivered a push notification and a pop up to thousands of users across the country. They used geolocation data targeting minor children to then force them to call congressional offices in order to continue using the app. And in doing so, these children called and they asked the question: what is Congress? And what is a Congressman? This influence campaign illustrates the need for this bill. 29:20 Rep. Warren Davidson (R-OH): The people sponsoring this bill today claim that the real issue is ownership. But who owns this company? It's not 100% owned by Bytedance. 60% of it's owned by investors, including American investors. 20% are owned by the founders and 20% are owned by over 7000 employees. The company's headquarters is not in China, it's in Singapore. And the American user data isn't housed in China. It's housed in Texas, controlled by a database owned by Oracle. 30:20 Rep. Warren Davidson (R-OH): So if we think we can address the privacy concerns, what's left to address? Frankly, content moderation. Remember, before Elon Musk bought the crime scene at Twitter, it was all a conspiracy theory that these algorithms were silencing and canceling people. You guys are crazy. Now when Elon Musk bought Twitter, he did keep it operating with 80% fewer employees. But what we found is a lot of the employees were trying to do content moderation, shape who sees what and how they see it, which algorithms are used, how does it promote certain people and, and filter others? So really, what you're saying here is if you're not fully engaged with America's three letter agencies in content moderation, we plan to 'TikTok' you. And this bill isn't just limited to TikTok. It's a coercive power that can be applied to other apps like Telegram, Tor. Things that provide privacy would be targeted by this bill. 34:20 Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA): First of all, this is not a ban on TikTok. I'm a grandmother of teenagers, I understand the entertainment value, the educational value, communication value, the business value for some businesses on this. This is not an attempt to ban TikTok. Its an attempt to make TikTok better. Tic Tac Toe. A winner, a winner. 41:00 Brett Guthrie (R-KY): I was asked, does this just affect TikTok? And no, it's any foreign adversary, or any app that is owned, controlled or unduly influenced by any foreign adversary. We must protect our national security and help keep America's private data out of the hands of our foreign adversaries. I urge support of this bill, and I yield back. 51:55 Rep. Larry Bucshon (R-IN): After hearing from national security experts last week, it is clear the prolific use of media platforms controlled by the Chinese Communist Party and other foreign adversaries poses a danger to our country. 53:15 Rep. Sydney Kamlager-Dove (D-CA): This bill would greatly expand the Executive's authority to ban tech companies with zero congressional oversight. I cannot sign a blank check to some future president who would easily and dangerously weaponize this legislation to profit in silence. 55:20 Rep. Kat Cammack (R-FL): We aren't banning a company, as the high paid lobbyists for Bytedance - which is owned by China - would lead you to believe. We aren't infringing on constitutionally protected speech or growing the size of government. All we're saying is, Break up with the Chinese Communist Party. 1:02:30 Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY): Who's going to be prosecuted by this bill? Is it Bytedance or TikTok? Will they be taken to court? No. I mean, they're the target of this, but how do you elicit or effect a ban on them? By prosecuting Americans? The only way you can ban TikTok and the other companies from being here is to say what this bill says, which is the government will bring a civil action suit against you, if you so much as host them here. If you have an app store that allows them to be here, you're an American or an American company and you will be the target of this bill. Those are the only people who can be pursued under this bill and I know it's in order to go after TikTok, or so they say. Music by Editing Production Assistance

As we enter another round of government funding drama, let’s learn the basics. In this episode, we examine how the process is supposed to work, spot the tell tale signs that something has gone wrong, and decipher all of the DC wonky words that make the appropriations process seem more complicated than it really is. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Appropriations February 8, 2023. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations. Mandatory vs. Discretionary Spending FiscalData.Treasury.gov. Updated October 24, 2022. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Government Shutdown February 26, 2024. Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget. Omnibus Bills Andrew Taylor. December 22, 2020. AP News. Earmarks February 9, 2005. Taxpayers for Common Sense. Retrieved from the Wayback Machine version from October 25, 2008. What Happens Next Jamie Dupree. March 5, 2024. Regular Order. Audio Sources House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Defense January 12, 2022 Witness: Mike McCord, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) Clips 29:51 Mike McCord: First, as I believe you’re all aware a full year CR, we reduce our funding level below what we requested and what we believe we need. On the surface at the department level as a whole, the reduction to our accounts would appear to be about a billion dollars below our request, which would be significant. Even if that was the only impact. The actual reduction in practice will be much greater. Because we would have significant funding that’s misaligned, trapped or frozen in the wrong places and unusable because we don’t have the tools or flexibilities to realign funds on anything like the scam we would need to fix all the problems that the chiefs are going to describe. 30:27 Mike McCord: I know all of you are very familiar with the fact that virtually all military construction projects in each year’s budget including the FY 22 budget are new starts that cannot be executed under a CR. Music by Editing Production Assistance

It’s been four months since President Biden requested over $100 billion in war money for Israel and Ukraine and the Senate has now passed a bill that would provide most of the money. In this episode, we examine the events that lead up to and have occurred since President Biden’s address to the nation, and analyze the Senate bill along with its possible paths to becoming law. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank’s online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes October 7 Attack Aluf Benn. February 21, 2024. Haaretz. Liza Rozovsky. January 6, 2024. Haaretz. Amos Harel. November 27, 2023. Haaretz. November 18, 2023. Josh Breiner. Haaretz. Hagar Shezaf and Jack Khoury. October 6, 2023. Haaretz. Aftermath of the October 7 Attack Ran Shimoni et al. February 24, 2024. Haaretz. October 20, 2023. White House Briefing Room. Michael D. Shear. October 19, 2023. The New York Times. October 19, 2023. Democracy Now! History of Palestine and Israel Bernard Avishai. February 2024. Harper’s Magazine. October 20, 2023. The World. Directed by Erin Axelman and Sam Eilertsen, produced by Daniel J. Chalfen, Nadia Saah, and Erin Axelman. 2023. OCHA. June 2022. UNICEF. Rashid Khalidi. Macmillan Audio: 2020. Directed by Abby Martin. 2019. Empire Files. Ian Black. Tantor Audio: 2018. Darryl Cooper. 2015-2016. Martyrmade Podcast. April 16, 2015. Defense for Children International - Palestine. March 2012. Visualizing Palestine. Balfour Declaration Zena Al Tahhan. November 2, 2018. Al Jazeera. Lord Arthur James Balfour. November 2, 1917. Jewish Virtual Library. Vanishing Palestine Retrieved on February 27, 2024. Wikipedia: the free Encyclopedia. October 11, 2023. BBC. Hagar Shezaf. December 11, 2020. Haaretz. May 12, 2020. Human Rights Watch. Mitchell Bard. Jewish Virtual Library. Al Jazeera. Alex Hartman et al. December 9, 2004. Adalah – The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel. 2003. Creation of Israel 1947. April 1983. United Nations. Lebanon Rania Abouzeid. October 21, 2023. The New Yorker. Tom Perry et al. October 18, 2022. Reuters. Dahiya Doctrine December 7, 2012. Institute for Middle East Understanding. Gabi Siboni. October 2, 2008. INSS Insight. November 23, 2006. UN General Assembly Human Rights Council. Gaza Death Toll AJLabs. Retrieved on February 27, 2024. Al Jazeera. Amna Nawaz and Sonia Kopelev. February 9, 2024. PBS NewsHour. Linda Dayan. December 26, 2023. Haaretz. June 23, 2015. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Caabu. Rory McCarthy. September 15, 2009. The Guardian. Post-October 7 Land Grab Henriette Chacar. February 23, 2024. Reuters. Julia Frankel. February 23, 2024. AP News. Liza Rozovsky. February 15, 2024. Haaretz. Nir Hasson and Rachel Fink. January 28, 2024. Haaretz. Abdelraouf Arnaout. January 3, 2024. Anadolu Agency. Itai Weiss. December 27, 2023. Haaretz. Yitzhak Benbaji et al. November 30, 2023. Haaretz. Isaac Chotiner. November 11, 2023. The New Yorker. Uploaded by LocalCall. October 13, 2023. Scribd. Gas Rights Walid Abuhelal. February 20, 2024. Middle East Eye. Israeli Nukes Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation. Ceasefire Amy Spiro et al. November 30, 2023. The Times of Israel. Omar Shakir. November 29, 2023. Human Rights Watch. The Destruction of Gaza James Mackenzie and Nidal Al-Mughrabi. February 15, 2024. Reuters. Mithil Aggarwal and Yasmine Salam. January 18, 2024. NBC News. Yahya R. Sarraj. December 24, 2023. The New York Times. Gabrielle Tétrault-Farber. December 21, 2023. Reuters. U.S. Aid to Israel Matthew Lee. December 29, 2023. PBS NewsHour. Michael D. Shear and Karoun Demirjian. October 20, 2023. The New York Times. Limiting Aid to Gaza Katie Polglase and Muhammad Darwish. February 21, 2024. CNN. Rachel Fink. February 7, 2024. Haaretz. Lindsey Hilsum. February 5, 2024. Channel 4 News. Jessica Le Masurier. February 5, 2024. France 24. Netanyahu Rejects Two State Solution January 19, 2024. DW. Why Does the U.S. Government Support Israel? OpenSecrets. Real American History Howard Zinn. Harper Audio: 2009. Ukraine Anatol Lieven. February 24, 2024. Time. Border Crisis Jamie Dupree. February 15, 2024. Regular Order. Caitlin Yilek. February 14, 2024. CBS News. Kelly Garrity. February 5, 2024. Politico. Bills Audio Sources February 11, 2024 Bernie Sanders on X October 19, 2023 C-SPAN Executive Producer Recommended Sources Music by Editing Production Assistance

7pm Saturday, January 20 To Share Brewing Company 720 Union St Manchester, NH 03104